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Abstract
The paper studies intertemporal information acquisition by agents
that are rational Bayesian learners and that dynamically optimize over
consumption, investment in capital, and investment in information. The
model predicts that investors acquire more information in times when fu-
ture capital productivity is expected to be high, the cost of capital is low,
new technologies are expected to have a persistent impact on productiv-
ity, and the scalability of investments is expected to be high. My results
shed light on the economic mechanisms behind various dynamic aspects
of information production by the financial sector, such as the sources of
variation in returns on information acquisition for investment banks or
private equity funds.
JEL topic area codes: C61, D83, D91, D92, G24
1 Introduction
The investors’ conditional information sets drive the dynamics of both as-
set prices and investment. Which economic factors determine the evolution of
the information sets? The asset pricing literature typically takes the informa-
tion flow to investors as exogenous and uses various instruments to capture the
dynamics of the information set.
In this paper, I endogenize the information set and explore the economic
determinants of intertemporal information acquisition decisions. I develop a
dynamic model in which investors are Bayesian learners who optimally choose
how much to consume, how much to invest, and how much information to ac-
quire. This model reveals various links between the investors’ efforts to learn
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paper was developed during my time in the Chicago Booth Ph.D. program. I thank John
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about new technologies and their conditional expectations on productivity, dis-
count factors, and scale economies.
The model predicts that investors acquire more information when future
capital productivity is expected to be high, expected returns are low, technology
changes are expected to have a persistent impact on productivity, and future
investment scalability, as for example influenced by liquidity, is expected to be
high. Economic mechanisms that decrease the scalability of investment diminish
the marginal gains from information acquisition since they restrict the flexibility
to respond to news.
The results imply various predictions on the determinants of variation in
knowledge acquisition by the financial service sector. Since human capital is
typically the scarce factor in information production, compensation and hiring
and firing decisions are expected to be linked to changes in financial institu-
tions’ expectations about future productivity, persistence of technologies, and
liquidity. Further, the theory rationalizes private equity and hedge funds’ pref-
erence for long-term capital commitments: lower dependence on future capital
contributions gives the funds greater flexibility in intertemporal investment de-
cisions. This increases returns on information acquisition. Firms that are more
financially constrained are predicted to benefit less from information acquisition
and thus will prefer to stay less informed. Further, private equity funds are pre-
dicted to stay less informed if they expect a less liquid IPO market and lower
capital productivity in the future.
Generally, variants of the presented model might be useful to analyze dif-
ferences in the information production technologies across investment firms and
the corresponding determinants of the latent evolution of knowledge and in-
vestment skill. In addition, on a more aggregated level, the model could be
used to analyze differences in the information acquisition technologies available
to investors across countries, which could be useful for policy considerations:
the framework links the characteristics of the information acquisition technol-
ogy available to investors in a financial system to intertemporal investment and
consumption allocations. This allows analyzing the impact of frictions to the
intertemporal scalability of information acquisition, for example as imposed by
labor market regulations, and changes in cost levels, for example as induced by
accounting regulations.
Model Approach
To make the analysis tractable the presented model uses a reduced form
representation of the equilibrium in the information market: an information
acquisition technology subsumes various economic mechanisms that have an
impact on the information acquisition cost faced by investors. A sequential
joint consumption, investment, information acquisition problem is analyzed for
a general time- and state-dependent information acquisition cost function and
the class of additively separable preferences.
The resulting intertemporal optimality condition for information acquisition
shows that the marginal return on uncertainty reduction satisfies - like all other
2
asset returns - the Euler equation, suggesting the interpretation of information
as an asset. The paper explores the dynamic relation between the marginal
return on this asset and technology changes.
Literature
Bayesian learning is an essential component of the presented framework.
The literature on asset market dynamics caused by learning typically considers
an exogenous evolution of information. Examples include Pastor and Veronesi
[1] and Hansen[2].1 A key distinction from this literature is the paper’s focus
on active information acquisition decisions which make the information flow to
agents endogenous.
Noisy rational expectations models in the spirit of Grossman and Stiglitz
[10] are traditionally used to analyze information acquisition in finance (Verrec-
chia [11]; Barlevy and Veronesi [12]; Peress [13]; Veldkamp [14]). These models
typically focus on aspects of asymmetric information and decentralization in
static environments.2 When applied to the analysis of joint dynamics in infor-
mation acquisition, investment, and consumption this type of setup quickly loses
tractability despite restrictive assumptions about information cost structures,
production technologies, and preferences. As shown later, the predictions of this
paper arise through the analysis of a dynamic setup with richer specifications
of technologies.
The paper shares with the recent literature on “rational inattention” (e.g.,
Sims [16], [17]; Luo [18]; Turmuhambetova [19]) that a dynamic setup is consid-
ered where information used by agents is endogenous. Yet, in contrast to the
literature following Sims this paper does not model how an individual allocates
her limited capacity to process available information. The literature follow-
ing Sims is “motivated by the idea that information that is freely available to
an individual may not be used, because of the individual’s limited information
processing capacity” [20]. In contrast, this paper considers producers of infor-
mation, like financial institutions that develop information that is not freely
available at the time when it is used or sold. Financial institutions hire employ-
ees who use available information in combination with costly investigation to
produce proprietary estimates of relevant investment measures. Sims explicitly
excludes actions of “costly investigation”[20], such as interviewing experts on
technologies and consumer surveys, from the activities where the constraints
modeled in the rational inattention framework are of relevance. In this paper
information acquisition cost refer to the full cost of developing information, such
as the cost of labor, IT infrastructure, and physical assets. It is not the shadow
price of a constraint to pay attention to information that an individual already
1Other papers on robust control are e.g., Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini [3], Hansen and
Sargent ([4], [5]) and Hansen, Sargent and Wang [6]). Learning is also a central concept to
other parts of the recent finance literature such as Pastor and Veronesi [7] (learning about
profitability), Lewellen and Shanken [8] (learning and asset pricing tests), Adrian and Franzoni
[9] (learning about time-varying factor loadings).
2Wang [15] considers a dynamic setup with asymmetric information but keeps information
exogenous.
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has at her disposal.3 This conceptually different focus leads to a different model
approach. Agents are Bayesian learners that form rational expectations condi-
tional on all information that is available to them.
Finally, Abel, Eberly, and Panageas [21] consider a setup where inattentive
agents update their information sporadically, rather than continuously. Opti-
mally inattentive behavior is generated by the assumption that the consumer
must pay a cost that is proportional to the portfolio’s contemporaneous value
to observe the value of his investment portfolio. The consumer optimally checks
his investment portfolio at equally spaced points in time, consuming from a
riskless transactions account in the interim.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next Section builds a model of joint
consumption, investment, and information acquisition decisions in a production
economy with time varying technology risk. Intertemporal optimality conditions
are presented and economic determinants of information acquisition by Bayesian
learners are examined. The model’s predictions are discussed in reference to
dynamic aspects of information production by the financial sector. Section 3
concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Production Technology
Consider a decision maker who may invest in a project with weakly decreas-
ing returns to scale. Let Ft denote the decision maker’s information set at date
t, Yt denote output at date t measured in terms of a single composite con-
sumption good, and Gt (·) be a strictly increasing, concave, and Ft-measurable
function. Given risky capital kt at date t, output at date (t+ 1) is determined
by the following relation:
Yt+1 = At+1Gt (kt) . (1)
In equation (1) the parameter At+1 is stochastic conditional on the information
set Ft. Ex post, at date (t+ 1) , the decision maker may infer the actual re-
alization of At+1 based on the observed output Yt+1 and the choice of kt. Let
εt = (εa,t, εs,t, εµ,t, εz,t)
′
be an i.i.d. Gaussian shock process with mean zero
and identity covariance matrix. The productivity factor At is assumed to have
the following exponential affine structure
at ≡ logAt = ωa + µt + σvεa,t, (2)
where ωa sets the unconditional mean of at, µt is a stationary hidden state
component with unconditional mean zero, and εa,t is an independent shock to
productivity that prevents the full revelation of the hidden state µt through the
3Even though employees’ limits to pay attention to information they already have may
influence their productivity this is likely not a central aspect for the analysis of financial
institutions. Sims [20] supports this view by stating that “sophisticated, continuously trading
investors have uncertainty that is dominated by information that is not freely available”.
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output realization Yt. σv is an exogenous scalar that determines the exposure
of productivity to unpredicTable noise εa,t. In this paper a stationary economy
is considered where the exogenous parameters ωa and σv are specified as time-
invariant. Yet, the derivation in the Appendix accommodates time variation
such that the analysis may be extended to study aspects like growth. Further,
for notational simplicity the time subscript on the Gt (·) function will usually
be suppressed in the following exposition. For the stochastic simulation of the
model that is presented below a Cobb-Douglas specification of the production
function is considered which yields the following representation:
Yt+1 = At+1k
1−η
t with 0 ≤ η < 1. (3)
In this specification the parameter η corresponds to the local curvature of the
production technology.
Production Technology Risk
Empirical evidence suggests that the exposure of economies to technology
risk exhibits time-variation (see e.g., Ng et al. [22]): during the internet or
biotech “revolutions” (Pastor and Veronesi [1]) in the 1980s and 1990s economies
like the US were exposed to substantial technological change and corresponding
high levels of technological uncertainty. Investors were confronted with the
task to predict the impact of the new technologies on productivity in the short,
medium, and long run in order to make investment decisions. To do so they had
to acquire information that allowed them to forecast changes in product markets,
consumer behavior, and business prospects. The blooming of the profession of
investment analysts during these times is anecdotal evidence for the increase in
aggregate demand for information acquisition capacities. In contrast, in other
times like in the years post 2000/2001 the capacities of analysts were markedly
reduced, resulting in the well known layoff waves in the financial sector.
For a theory on dynamics in information acquisition by investors time-
variation in technology risk thus seems to be an essential ingredient. In the
model the notion of time varying exposures to technology risk is captured by
the specification of the evolution of µt, the persistent component of log produc-
tivity at. Technology risk therefore refers to shocks that also have an impact on
productivity in future periods. It is this feature that makes “new technologies”
a learning target for investors. In particular, µt is assumed to follow a stationary
Markov process that is mean reverting to zero:
µt+1 = φµµt + σµ,tεµ,t+1 , 0 ≤ φµ < 1. (4)
The time-varying exposure to technology risk σ2µ,t is governed by the Markov
state zt which evolves according to the following stationary process:
zt+1 = ωz + φzzt + σzεz,t+1, 0 ≤ φz < 1. (5)
A Ft−measurable, positive-valued function σ2µ,t (zt) maps the state zt into a risk
exposure σ2µ,t. For the simulation results that are presented later in the paper
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an EGARCH type of specification (Nelson [23]) of the function σ2µ,t (zt) is used:
σ2µ,t = ϕσ exp {zt} , ϕσ > 0. (6)
2.2 Information Acquisition Technology
In reality, a variety of economic factors have an impact on the information
acquisition technology available to investors. Essentially the financial system as
a whole determines the cost of acquiring information on projects in the economy:
laws and regulations, the accounting system with institutions like the SEC, the
development of the banking system and financial intermediaries, availability of
human capital, and the micro-structure of stock markets and trading platforms,
to mention only a short list of potentially relevant factors.
A broad finance and accounting literature suggests that a system of efficient
disclosure rules, financial intermediaries (Diamond [24]), and financial contracts
(Townsend [25]) reduces information asymmetries and mitigates the duplication
of effort. Law systems influence corporate governance and investors’ facility to
monitor a company’s operations and outcomes in timely fashion (La Porta et
al. [26]; D’Avolio et al. [27]; Dyck et al. [28]).4 Trading technologies and the
structure of information markets influence the dissemination and aggregation
of information held by market participants and thus the cost of information ac-
quisition faced by investors (Diamond and Verrecchia [29]; Hellwig [30]; Admati
[31]; Admati and Pfleiderer [32], [33], [34]; Veldkamp [14]).
In order not to get lost in the variety of these mechanisms and to maintain
a focus on joint dynamics in investment, consumption, and information acquisi-
tion this paper proposes a reduced form approach to characterize the informa-
tion acquisition technology available to investors. The technology, specified by
a cost function over information precision, subsumes various economic mecha-
nisms that determine the costliness of information, including effects induced by
informational externalities. The cost structure is the outcome of equilibria in
other markets that are of relevance for information acquisition, or in short by
the “information market.” The decision maker takes this cost structure as ex-
ogenously given. Quantity decisions are assumed to be not publicly observable.
The price of capital is equal to one in terms of the composite consumption good
and does not signal additional information.
In terms of the model the decision maker may influence the precision of a
signal st that she obtains jointly with the production output at the end of each
period. The signal structure is specified as follows:
st+1 = µt+1 +
σv√
ιt
εs,t+1. (7)
The strictly positive and continuous decision variable ιt controls information
acquisition by scaling the noise variance of the signal st+1. Obtaining one signal
4Laws also influence investors’ protection against expropriation by insiders and corporate
governance control rights.
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with noise variance σ2v/ιt is informationally equivalent to obtaining ιt separate,
independent signals with noise variance σ2v ; conditional uncertainty is reduced
by the same amount. Since the parameter σv is common to the specifications
of st+1 and at+1 the scaling implies that choosing ιt = 1 corresponds to the
acquisition of information that has the same signal-to-noise ratio as the period’s
log-productivity realization at+1.
The cost of acquiring a signal st+1 with noise variance σ
2
v,t/ιt is specified
by the function nt (ιt). The model is analyzed for a general time and state
dependent,5 strictly increasing and convex cost function which is required to
satisfy n′t (ιt)|ιt=0 = 0, for all t, to ensure strictly positive choices of ι. The
convexity of nt (ιt) reflects the notion that acquiring an additional independent
signal becomes more costly the more information is acquired in a given period.
For the simulation of the model, the following functional form will be considered:
nt (ιt) =
χ
κ+ 1
· ικ+1t , with κ ≥ 0 and χ > 0. (8)
The specification features two properties of an information acquisition technol-
ogy: the marginal cost of information acquisition and the costliness of varying
learning effort intertemporally. The parameter χ shifts the marginal cost, the
parameter κ influences the local curvature of nt (ιt).
Bayesian Updating
Due to the conditional knowledge of the Markov state zt which governs
the risk exposures σ2µ,t a version of Kalman filtering with time varying signal
precision is applicable. As a Bayesian learner, the agent updates his beliefs about
the hidden productivity state based on observed realizations of the random
variables at and st. Let (a
t, st) denote the whole history of signals that the
decision maker obtained up to date t, i.e.,(
at, st
)
≡ {(at, st) , (at−1, st−1) , (at−2, st−2) , · · · } ,
and define the conditional mean µ̂t ≡ E [µt+1| at, st] and the conditional vari-
ance σ̂2t ≡ V ar [µt+1| at, st]. Given the initial prior distribution of the hidden
productivity state is normal, µ1 ∼ N
(
µ̂0, σ̂
2
0
)
, the posterior density at date
t is also normal, µt+1 ∼ N
(
µ̂t, σ̂
2
t
)
, where the conditional mean µ̂t and the
conditional variance σ̂2t follow from the Kalman filter recursions:
µ̂t = φµ
at − ωa,t−1 + ιt−1st + σ
2
v
σ̂2t−1
µ̂t−1
1 + ιt−1 +
σ2v
σ̂2t−1
(9a)
σ̂2t ≡ V ar
[
µt+1| at, st
]
= σ2µ,t + σ̂
2
p,t, (9b)
5It is required that the state that governs variation in the functional form of nt (ιt) is
exogenous to the decision maker.
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where σ̂2p,t denotes the pre-shock conditional variance at time t which is defined
as follows:
σ̂2p,t
(
σ̂2t−1, ιt−1
)
≡ φ2µ
σ2v
1 + ιt−1 +
σ2v
σ̂2t−1
. (10)
2.3 Decision Problem
The decision maker solves a sequential joint consumption-, investment-, in-
formation acquisition problem. Choices are ranked by von Neumann Morgen-
stern preferences. Let βt ∈ (0, 1) be a Ft−measurable discount factor for the
time period from t to (t+ 1) and F (ct) be a strictly increasing and concave
one-period utility function. Further, let yt ≡ log Yt denote log-output. Given
an initial state vector x0 ≡
(
y0, µ̂0, σ̂
2
p,0, z0
)′
, consider the sequential problem
to maximize
F (ct) + Et
∞∑
j=1
(
j−1∏
i=0
βt+i
)
F (ct+j) (11)
subject to the budget restriction
ct = Yt − kt − nt (ιt) (12)
and the transition laws and technologies specified in equations (1) - (10). Asso-
ciated with this problem is the Bellman equation
V (xt) = max
ut=(kt,ιt)
′
{F (ct) + βtE [V (xt+1) |xt,ut]} (13)
with the vector of state variables xt ≡
(
yt, µ̂t, σ̂
2
p,t, zt
)′
, and the vector of con-
trols ut≡ (kt, ιt)′, and where V (xt) denotes the optimal value of the objective
function (11) starting from state xt. E [·|xt,ut] denotes the mathematical ex-
pectation given the vectors (xt,ut) which yield a sufficient statistic for the
conditional distribution of the next period state xt+1. While µ̂t and σ̂
2
p,t char-
acterize the conditional distribution of the hidden state µt+1, the observable
Markov state zt determines the distribution of the next period technology risk
exposure σ2µ (zt+1). The state vector transition equations are given below.
yt+1 = at+1 + logGt (kt)
µ̂t+1 = φµ
at+1−ωa,t+ιtst+1+
σ2v
σ̂2t
µ̂t
1+ιt+
σ2v
σ̂2t
σ̂2p,t+1 = φ
2
µ
σ2v
1+ιt+
σ2v
σ̂2t
zt+1 = ωz + φzzt + σzεz,t+1
(14)
8
2.4 Optimality Conditions
The envelope condition and the first order necessary condition for capital kt
yield the familiar Euler equation
E [At+1G
′ (kt)mt+1|xt,ut] = 1, (15)
where mt+1 ≡ βtF
′(ct+1)
F ′(ct)
denotes the stochastic discount factor and At+1G
′ (kt)
the marginal gross return on capital. Note that information acquisition decisions
play a central role in the Euler equation: by controlling information acquisition
ι, the investor influences the evolution of the conditional information set and
thus the conditional expectations operator in the Euler equation (15). Dynam-
ics in asset prices are thus directly linked to decisions on ι and their economic
determinants. This is a key distinction from the existing literature that analyzes
dynamics induced by Bayesian learning but takes the information flow as ex-
ogenous. In reference to the language used in empirical asset pricing, the set of
signals obtained by the investor may be viewed as an “endogenous instrument”
that summarizes conditional information.
Optimization generates restrictions on intertemporal information acquisition
and thus on the information flow to investors. Let λ denote Lebesgue measure
and f (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1|xt,ut) the joint conditional probability density func-
tion of the vector (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
. The first order necessary condition for
information acquisition ιt may be written as follows:
n′t (ιt)F
′ (ct)
βt
(16)
=
∫ (
∂µ̂t+1
∂ιt
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
+
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∂ιt
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
)
·
f (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1|xt,ut) dλ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1) +∫
V (xt+1)
∂f (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1|xt,ut)
∂ιt
dλ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
where µ̂t+1 = µ̂t+1
(
at+1, st+1, µ̂t, σ̂
2
t , ιt
)
and σ̂2p,t+1 = σ̂
2
p,t+1
(
σ̂2t , ιt
)
. The fol-
lowing Proposition gives the associated necessary intertemporal optimality con-
dition.
Proposition 1. The decision problem associated with the Bellman equation (13)
implies the following necessary intertemporal condition for optimal information
acquisition ι :
Et
[
mt+1
Πt+1 + δt+1MCt+1
(
σ̂2p,t+2
)
MCt
(
σ̂2p,t+1
) ] = 1 (17)
where mt+1 =
βtF
′(ct+1)
F ′(ct)
denotes the stochastic discount factor and the following
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definitions apply
Πt+1 ≡
1
2
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
− ∂
2V RS(xt+1,ut+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
F ′ (ct+1)
=
1
2
∂2V RS(xt+1,ut+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂kt+1
∂kt+1(xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
+
∂2V RS(xt+1,ut+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂ιt+1
∂ιt+1(xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
F ′ (ct+1)
MCt
(
σ̂2p,t+1
)
≡ n′t (ιt)
/
−
∂σ̂2p,t+1
(
σ̂2t , ιt
)
∂ιt
∂σ̂2p,t+1
(
σ̂2t , ιt
)
∂ιt
≡ −
φ2µσ
2
v,t(
1 + ιt +
σ2v,t
σ̂2t
)2
δt+1 ≡
∂σ̂2p,t+2
(
σ̂2t+1, ιt+1
)
∂σ̂2t+1
=
φ2µ(
1 + (1 + ιt+1)
σ̂2t+1
σ2v
)2
and where V RS
(
xt+1,ut+1
)
denotes the right side of the Bellman equation (13)
evaluated at the optimal policy rule u (xt+1).
Proof. See Appendix.
Discussion of Proposition 1
Equation (17) indicates that at the optimum, the marginal return on uncer-
tainty reduction satisfies an Euler equation: current marginal cost of reducing
uncertainty, denoted by MCt
(
σ̂2p,t+1
)
, are compensated by a future, stochastic
benefit which may be decomposed into two components: Πt+1, which is accru-
ing at time (t+ 1), and subsequent benefits of value δt+1MCt+1
(
σ̂2p,t+2
)
, where
δt+1 captures the notion of depreciation of information. The structure of this
marginal return is similar to the one of a return on capital where the next pe-
riod benefit consists of a dividend payment and a remaining depreciated capital
value. The representation suggests that marginal uncertainty reduction induced
by information acquisition may be viewed as an asset that generates a stream
of benefits in future periods. In the following, the terms in equation (17) are
discussed in more detail.
Πt+1 : Marginal Next Period Benefit of Uncertainty Reduction
Πt+1, the marginal next period benefit of uncertainty reduction, is generated
by state-contingent adjustments to tomorrow’s controls u (xt+1) in reaction to a
more precise productivity estimate. Aversion against uncertainty about the next
period productivity estimate µ̂t+1, as represented by the curvature of the value
function
(
∂2V (xt+1) /∂µ̂
2
t+1
)
, is alleviated by additional information acquisition
since next period’s decisions optimally take into account additional information.
SubSection 2.5 considers an approximation of Πt+1 which sheds more light on
the economic determinants of this term.
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MCt
(
σ̂2p,t+1
)
: Marginal Cost of Uncertainty Reduction
MCt
(
σ̂2p,t+1
)
denotes the marginal cost of reducing next period’s condi-
tional uncertainty about the hidden productivity state µt+1. The subscript t
indicates that the marginal cost function MCt
(
σ̂2p,t+1
)
is Ft−measurable, it de-
pends on the uncertainty level σ̂2t at date t . The marginal cost are influenced by
(a) the marginal cost of information n′t (ιt) as determined by the information ac-
quisition technology and (b) the marginal impact of information on conditional
uncertainty
(
∂σ̂2p,t+1/∂ιt
)
which is determined by the Ricatti-difference equa-
tion resulting from Kalman filtering. Convexity of nt (ιt) and strict convexity of
σ̂2p,t+1 (ιt) ensure that the function MCt
(
σ̂2p,t+1
)
is strictly declining in σ̂2p,t+1
over its domain
(
0; σ̂2t
)
. In other words, the lower the choice of next period’s
pre-shock conditional variance σ̂2p,t+1 the more costly is a further marginal re-
duction. The marginal cost are high when the current level of uncertainty σ̂2t
is already relatively low and/or a lot of information is acquired in this period.
MCt
(
σ̂2p,t+1
)
goes to infinity as σ̂2p,t+1 approaches zero.
δt+1 : Depreciation of Information
The Ft+1−measurable parameter δt+1 measures by how much a marginal
decline in risk at date (t+ 1) reduces risk at date (t+ 2), i.e., it quantifies an
intertemporal informational externality. Information on the hidden productiv-
ity state at time t also contains information on the hidden state at time (t+ 1).
Yet, the predictive precision is reduced (0 < δt+1 < 1). δt+1 has the inter-
pretation of a depreciation factor that measures the speed at which information
becomes irrelevant. In equation (17) MCt+1
(
σ̂2p,t+2
)
is therefore depreciated by
the factor δt+1. Obsolescence of information is caused by technological change
and thus influenced by the process parameters that determine the persistence of
productivity. Higher values of φµ increase the persistence of the hidden produc-
tivity state µt and therefore increase δt+1. The parameter φz which influences
the persistence of risk exposures has a more ambivalent impact on δt+1: con-
ditional on a high level of technology risk σ2µ (zt), high values of φz tend to
diminish δt+1 since higher future technology shocks tend to diminish the per-
sistence of µt. On the other hand, conditional on low technology risk at time t,
higher values of φz tend to increase δt+1.
mt+1 : Stochastic Discount Factor
Just like the return on any other asset, the return on information is dis-
counted by the stochastic discount factor mt+1. Conversely, a given discount
factor implies restrictions on the marginal returns on information acquisition.
Overall, equation (17) ensures that the decision maker sets today’s marginal
utility sacrifice equal to the expected utility gain arising from future state con-
tingent decision adjustments in reaction to a more precise productivity estimate.
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2.5 The Marginal Benefit Πt+1
The following two Propositions analyze the term Πt+1 in more detail.
Proposition 2. The addends that enter Πt+1 may be written as follows:
∂2V RS(xt+1,ut+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂kt+1
∂kt+1(xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
F ′ (ct+1)
=
Covt+1 [st+2, At+2G
′ (kt+1)mt+2]
V art+1 [µt+2]
∂kt+1 (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∂2V RS(xt+1,ut+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂ιt+1
∂ιt+1(xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
F ′ (ct+1)
= −
φ2µβt+1σ
2
v,t+1
F ′ (ct+1)
(
1 + ιt+1 +
σ2v,t+1
σ̂2t+1
)2 ∂ιt (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1 ·Et+1
∂ ∂V (xt+2)∂σ̂2p,t+2 − 12 ∂
2V (xt+2)
∂µ̂2t+2
∂yt+2
+
Et+1
φµ · ∂ ∂V (xt+2)∂σ̂2p,t+2 − 12 ∂
2V (xt+2)
∂µ̂2t+2
∂µ̂t+2

For small φµ, and given a regularity condition is satisfied
6, the second addend
is, to a first order approximation, equal to zero, i.e.,
∂2V RS(xt+1,ut+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂ιt+1
∂ιt+1(xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
F ′ (ct+1)
(18)
≈ φ2µb (xt+1, φµ)
∣∣
φµ=0
+
d
{
φ2µb (xt+1, φµ)
}
dφµ
∣∣∣∣∣
φµ=0
φµ
= 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
6Define the function
b (xt, φµ)
≡ −
σ2v,tβt(
1 + ιt (xt, φµ) +
σ2v,t
σ̂2t
)2
Et
∂
∂V (xt+1(φµ),φµ)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
− 1
2
∂2V (xt+1(φµ),φµ)
∂µ̂2t+1
∂yt+1
+
Et
φµ · ∂
∂V (xt+1(φµ),φµ)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
− 1
2
∂2V (xt+1(φµ),φµ)
∂µ̂2t+1
∂µ̂t+1

 ·
∂ιt(xt,φµ)
∂µ̂t
F ′ (ct (xt, φµ))
We require that
{|φµb (xt, φµ)|}|φµ=0 = 0{∣∣∣∣φ2µ ∂b (xt, φµ)∂φµ
∣∣∣∣}∣∣∣∣
φµ=0
= 0.
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Proposition 3. Given that the period return function F (ct) is linear, G (kt)
is strictly concave, and given the regularity condition stated in Proposition 2 is
satisfied, the following first order approximation of Πt+1 around φµ = 0 holds:
Πt+1 (xt+1, φµ) ≈ Πt+1 (xt+1, φµ)|φµ=0 +
∂Πt+1 (xt+1, φµ)
∂φµ
∣∣∣∣
φµ=0
φµ
=
kt+1 (xt+1)
2ηt+1 (xt+1)
,
where
ηt+1 (xt+1) ≡ −
G′′ (kt+1 (xt+1))
G′ (kt+1 (xt+1))
kt+1 (xt+1) .
If, in addition, G (kt) = k
1−η
t , with 0 < η < 1, we obtain
Πt+1 (xt+1) ≈
((1− η)Et+1 [At+2]βt+1)
1
η
2η
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Discussion
Proposition 2 shows that, to a first order approximation around φµ = 0,
the state contingent adjustments to the control ιt+1 in response to additional
information have a negligible impact on the marginal benefit of information
acquisition.
In Proposition 3 the setup is specialized to the case where the curvature from
the period return function is set to zero. This case turns out to be instructive
since the results become more tractable. Linear utility implies that the deci-
sion maker essentially maximizes discounted cash flows, where {ct} represents
the dividend process that the project generates. The assumption of exogenous
discount factors β shuts off the potential incentive channel to reduce future cost
of capital, but substantially increases the tractability of the analysis. The in-
vestment project is assumed to exhibit strictly declining returns to scale, i.e.,
G′′ (kt) < 0. The agent decides when and how much capital to place in the
project and when and how much resources to commit to research activities.
This setup captures features of the decision problem of investment banks
and other financial institutions like private equity funds which, over time, de-
cide on the amount of resources spent on investment research. In practice, an
institution’s capacity to acquire information on investments will largely depend
on the quality and quantity of its staff. The costliness of intertemporal changes
to research capacities are influenced by the labor market and frictions induced
by laws and regulations. Such aspects may be captured by the curvature of the
cost function n (ι). Further, recall that ι denotes the amount of independent in-
formation acquired. With an increasing number of hired analysts the marginal
analyst likely generates less additional independent information. This aspect
also contributes to the convexity of the cost function n (ι).
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Proposition 3 indicates that the marginal benefit Πt+1 is not level indepen-
dent. It depends on the scale of investment kt+1. This paper considers the
case of stationary productivity. In the case of growth, adjustments to the in-
formation acquisition technology would have to capture the increasing cost of
obtaining comparable information levels for larger projects.
Uncertainty reduction yields a more precise conditional productivity esti-
mate in each future state. This in turn allows sharper variations in the deci-
sions in reaction to different estimates in the various future states of the world.
For example, in the state of a high conditional productivity estimate, more
precision might encourage the decision maker to reduce consumption more in
favor of investment. Yet, curvature on the production function, as character-
ized by the elasticity ηt, which diminishes the variability of investment, reduces
the marginal benefit of information acquisition. The elasticity scales down the
benefit since it reduces the decision maker’s flexibility to adjust future controls
in response to different signals in different states of the world. The following
comparative statics summarize the results from Proposition 3.
Comparative Statics (in Ref. to Proposition 3) The benefit of informa-
tion acquisition is higher in times
1. when productivity is expected to be high
2. when discount factors are high (less discounting)
3. when the scalability of investments is high
4. when technology changes are expected to have a persistent impact on pro-
ductivity.
The simulations of the model presented below mirror these results. The
plots displayed in Figure I show changes in average information acquisition as
induced by changes in different exogenous parameters of the model. Details of
the simulation are given in the description below Figure I.
Higher marginal cost of information acquisition, as influenced by the pa-
rameter χ, decrease information acquisition. A higher value of η decreases the
scalability of investment and thus reduces information acquisition ι. High per-
sistence in productivity, as captured by the parameter φµ, increases the future
value of information about the current state of productivity and therefore en-
courages information acquisition. The parameter ωz changes the unconditional
level of technology risk σ2µ : higher exogenous risk exposures increase the in-
centive to obtain information (Note that due to the exponential specification of
σ2µ the case of ωz = 0 does not correspond to the absence of technology risk.).
Finally, the parameter ωa varies the unconditional productivity level: higher
productivity increases capital investment k and thus the incentive to acquire
information.
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Figure 2: The plots show percentage changes in average information acquisition
ι, relative to the level under the base parameter setup listed below. Variation is
caused by changes in the exogenous parameters indicated on the horizontal axes.
All other parameters are fixed at their base levels. An exception is the plot that
considers variation in η: Here the parameter ωa is adjusted simultaneously to
keep the deterministic steady state output level fixed. Without this adjustment
the effect goes in the same direction and is even more pronounced. The plots
are based on a stochastic simulation of the model under the assumptions made
in proposition 3. A second order Taylor approximation of the decision and
transition functions of the model are computed. The method uses a perturbation
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FIGURE I: The plots show percentage changes in average information acqui-
sition ι, relative to the level under the base parameter setup listed in Table
1. Variation is caused by changes in the exogenous parameters indicated on
the horizontal ax s. All o her parameters are at their b se levels. An
exception is the plot that considers variation in η: here the parameter ωa is ad-
justed simultaneously to keep the deterministic steady state output level fixed.
Without this djustment the effect goes in th sam direction and is eve more
pronounced. The plots are based on a stochastic simulation of the model under
the assumptions made in Proposition 3. A second order Taylor approximation
of the decision and transition functions of the model are computed. The method
uses a perturbation approach (Judd [35]) for computing the quadratic approxi-
mation of the policy function. The base parameter setup for the simulations is
provided in Table I.
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Base Parameter Setup
φµ 0.5000 β 0.9500
η 0.5000 σz 0.3000
ωa 0.3722 σv 0.0500
χ 0.0050 φz 0.6000
κ 4.0000 ωz 0.0000
ϕσ 0.0030
Simulated Mean Values
Y 1.0866 a 0.3780
c 0.5683 s 0.0016
k 0.5162 µ̂ 0.0033
ι 0.6109 σ2µ 0.0038
σ̂2 0.0094 z 0.0059
Table 1: The table lists the base parameters and simulated mean values of
endogenous variables from the solution (see additional details in the caption of
Figure I).
Interpretation of the Years Pre and Post 2000/2001
The results may shed some light on the substantial employment fluctua-
tions at major investment banks observed in the years pre and post 2000/2001.
Traditionally, especially Anglo-Saxon investment houses have a reputation for
substantial employment fluctuations. In 1996, for example, headcount at Gold-
man Sachs was 6000; by 2001, it was 23,000 and by 2003 it was down to 19,500.
Merrill Lynch increased the number of employees from 46,000 in 1995 to 72,000
in 2000, and then made 24,000 redundancies globally in two years from mid
2001 to mid 2003. As shown in Figure II, these examples were no exceptions —
other top investment banks saw similar employment fluctuations.
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6 Employment Fluctuations at Major Investment Banks
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Figure 1: Employment fluctuations at major investment banks. This figure
plots changes in the number of employees at major investment banks relative
to their level in 1996. ¥
In the late 1990s conditional productivity estimates were presumably good.
Investors were likely to expect that the new internet technologies would have
a persistent impact on future productivity, making them a valuable object to
learn about. At the same time, according to the analysis, low expected returns
would have further increased the incentive to acquire information.
In contrast, post 2000/2001, productivity forecasts were revised downwards
markedly (compare figure 6 in Pastor and Veronesi [36] on profitability). Mar-
kets exhibited low liquidity which increased the cost of adjusting investment
levels in reaction to information. Further, accounting scandals were essentially
deteriorating the financial system’s information acquisition technology; they ef-
fectively increased the cost of information acquisition faced by investors. The
cheap signal from financial records turned out to be noisier than previously
thought. Finally, risk prices increased quite substantially.
Overall, these ’stylized facts’ seem to match the predictions on the dynamic
links between information acquisition and the asset market fairly well. Labor is
a costly overhead for financial institutions, frictions to changing the size of the
work force may be quite substantial. The results suggests that hiring and firing
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FIGURE II: Employment fluctuations at major investment banks. This figure
plots changes i the number of employees at major investment banks relative
to their level in 1996.
In the late 1990s conditional productivity estimates were presumably good.
Investors were likely to expect that the new internet technologies would have
a persistent impact on future productivity, making them a valuable object to
learn about. At the same time, according to the analysis, low expected returns
would have further increased the incentive to acquire information.
In contrast, post 2000/2001, productivity forecasts were revised downwards
markedly (compare Figure 6 in Pastor and Veronesi [36] on profitability). Mar-
kets exhibited low liquidity which increased the cost of adjusting investment
levels in reaction to information. Further, accounting scandals were essentially
deteriorating the financial system’s information acquisition technology; they ef-
fectively increased the cost of infor ation acquisition faced by investors. The
cheap signal from financial records turned out to be noisier than previously
thought. Finally, risk prices increased quite substantially.
Overall, these stylized fac s seem to match the predic ions on the ynamic
links between information acquisition and the asset market fairly well. Labor is
a costly overhead for financial institutions, frictions to changing the size of the
work force may be quite substantial. The results suggests that hiring and firing
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decisions by the financial sector might be an interesting signal of the institutions’
conditional expectations on productivity, expected returns, and liquidity.
Long Term Investments, Financial Constraints, and Liquidity
The model also sheds some light on the fact that private equity funds and
hedge funds benefit more from investment research if clients commit capital for
a longer time horizon. Long-term capital commitments reduce outside restric-
tions on the funds’ intertemporal investment allocation and thus increase the
value of marginal knowledge. The results also suggest that private equity funds’
information acquisition on start-ups is more valuable when liquid IPO markets,
high productivity, and low cost of capital are anticipated in the future.
Generally, restrictions on future investment decisions as for example imposed
by required cash outflows are predicted to decrease an institution’s investments
in information: it binds the intertemporal investment policy and diminishes
the flexibility to respond to marginal information. Firms that are financially
constrained and thus face limitations to the scalability of their investments are
likely to invest less in research on the productivity of available projects.
2.6 Human Capital and Information Acquisition
In this Section I consider a slightly adjusted setup where the agent has some
human capital or skill to acquire information. The level of skill is subject to
depreciation and there are adjustment cost. The level of human capital will be
denoted by h. To ensure tractability, the hidden productivity state µt is now
assumed to be independently distributed over time such that signals have value
in exactly one period. This setup is convenient since it will allow us to write the
marginal return on information acquisition in terms of known functions of con-
sumption, information acquisition, and the level of human capital, without the
need for an approximation. Similar to before, we consider an affine specification
for at+1:
at+1 = ωa,t + µt + σaεa,t+1. (19)
Notice that there is a slight twist in the timing relative to the setup used so far:
at+1 is now a function of µt, not of µt+1. Since the signal structure will be left
unchanged (as in equation (7)) this timing change is necessary for the signal
to have value under the assumption that µt is independently distributed over
time. Specifically, µt is now assumed to be normal with zero mean and variance
σ2µ,t−1, where, as before σ
2
µ,t−1, is specified as a function of the Markov state
zt−1:
µt = σ
2
µ,t−1εµ,t (20)
To allow for persistent changes in conditional expectations about productivity
ωa,t is now assumed to follow a stationary Markov process:
ωa,t+1 = ω̄ + φωωa,t + σωεω,r+1. (21)
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In this Section, skill to acquire information is determined by past information
acquisition activity. This assumption is motivated by the notion of learning on
the job: the more information the agent acquired in the past the more proficient
she has become, and the fewer resources she needs to exert to acquire new
information today. To capture this notion in the simplest form, the level of
human capital ht will be set equal to last period’s information acquisition level
ιt, depreciated by a factor δh that accounts for the speed with which this type
of human capital becomes obsolescent, i.e., it characterizes the persistence in
skill:
ht = δhιt−1 with 0 ≤ δh < 1. (22)
For simplicity, I consider a quadratic information acquisition cost function7
that features the notion that higher levels of human capital ht allow the agent
to acquire information at lower cost:
n (ιt, ht) = χ
(ιt − ht)2
2
with χ > 0. (23)
The budget constraint is now given by
Yt = kt + n (ιt, ht) + ct. (24)
The level of human capital ht and the conditional log productivity parameter
ωa,t yield two additional state variables. The state may thus be summarized by
the vector xt =
(
yt, ht, ωa,t, µ̂t, σ̂
2
t , zt
)′
. The corresponding state vector transi-
tion equations are given by:
yt+1 = at+1 + log {G (kt)}
ht+1 = δhιt
ωa,t+1 = ω̄ + φωωa,t + σωεω,r+1
µ̂t+1 =
σ2µ
σ2µ+
σ2v
ιt
st+1
σ̂2t+1 =
σ2µ,t
1+
σ2µ,t
σ2v
ιt
zt+1 = ωz + φzzt + σzεz,t+1
(25)
Proposition 4. The decision problem associated with the Bellman equation
(13) adjusted by the specifications given in equations (19) to (25) implies the
following necessary intertemporal condition for optimal information acquisition
ι :
Et
[
mt+1
Πt+1 + δt+1MCt+1
(
σ̂2t+2
)
MCt
(
σ̂2t+1
) ] = 1,
7The results do not hinge on this specific functional form. More generally, the results hold
for any strictly increasing, weakly convex function n (ι, h), with ∂n (ι, h) /∂ι|ι=0 ≤ 0 for h ≥ 0.
Merely for the purpose of simplifying the final expression, Proposition 4 also uses the special
relation ∂n (ι, h) /∂ι = −∂n (ι, h) /∂h that holds under this quadratic functional specification
(see Appendix).
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where mt+1 =
βtF
′(ct+1)
F ′(ct)
denotes the stochastic discount factor, and
Πt+1 =
1
2
(
st+1
σ2µ,t
G (kt+1)
G′ (kt+1)
− Covt+1 [at+2,mt+2Yt+2]
V art+1 [at+2]
)
MCt
(
σ̂2t+1
)
= −nι (ιt, ht)
/
∂σ̂2t+1
(
σ2µ,t, ιt
)
∂ιt
δt+1 = δh
∂σ̂2t+2
(
σ2µ,t+1, ιt+1
)
∂ιt+1
/
∂σ̂2t+1
(
σ2µ,t, ιt
)
∂ιt
∂σ̂2t+1
(
σ2µ,t, ιt
)
∂ιt
= −σ2µ,t
σ2µ,t
σ2v
(
1 + ιt
σ2µ,t
σ2v
)−2
Under linear utility with exogenous, discount factors β, and G (kt) = k
1−η with
0 < η < 1, the following equation holds
Et
[
Πγ=0t+1
]
= Et
[
kt+1
2η
]
= Et
[
((1− η)βEt+1 [At+2])
1
η
2η
]
=
((1− η)β)
1
η e
1
η{ω̄+φωωa,t+ 12 (σ̂2t+1+σ2v)+ 12η (σ2ω+σ4µ,t/V art[st+1])}
2η
Proof. See Appendix.
The structure of the optimality condition in Proposition 4 is similar to the
ones presented in the previous Propositions 1 and 3. In particular, for the
case of linear utility, the formula provided for Et [Πt+1] is identical to the one
given in Proposition 3. The benefit of the setup considered in Proposition 4
is that the results do not hinge on the approximation assumptions made under
Propositions 2 and 3. This is due to the fact that persistence in skill, as modeled
in this Section, provides a more tractable intertemporal link than persistence in
the hidden productivity state.
It is worth noting that given ωa,t and σ
2
µ,t are time invariant (i.e., under
i.i.d. productivity) there is a constant optimal steady state level for ι that is
implicitly determined by the provided optimality condition.
Limitations and Policy Implications
The framework remains agnostic with respect to the relative importance
of the various economic forces that determine the parameters of the informa-
tion acquisition technology. Which economic factors drive the level of marginal
cost and which have an impact on the intertemporal scalability of information
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acquisition? Which transition policies would be required to alter information ac-
quisition technologies of a financial system and how costly are these transitions?
These questions call for a more explicit analysis of micro-economic information
structures and are not addressed by this paper. They are subject of an im-
portant literature that explicitly studies different market and intermediation
structures.
Yet, the framework may give guidance on the properties of an information
acquisition technology that are of relevance. For example, low persistence in
the process that governs technology risk exposures of an economy increases
the relative value of flexibility enhancing policies, such as reductions of labor
market rigidities. In a cost-benefit analysis of different system reform policies
the framework might help identifying the relative benefits from altering different
channels of a financial system that influence information acquisition.
3 Conclusion
In this paper I examine the link between optimal information acquisition
and conditional expectations on future asset market dynamics. The presented
model predicts that investors that are Bayesian learners acquire more informa-
tion in times when future capital productivity is expected to be high, expected
returns are low, new technologies are expected to have a persistent impact on
productivity, and future investment scalability is expected to be high. Economic
mechanisms that decrease the scalability of investment diminish the marginal
gains from information acquisition since they restrict the flexibility to respond
to news.
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A Appendix
A.1 Decision Problem
Let kt be risky investment, ct consumption, ιt learning-effort, and Ft the
decision maker’s information set at time t which includes the history of signals
23
denoted by (at, st) ≡ {(at, st) , (at−1, st−1) , (at−2, st−2) , · · · }. The production
technology is given by
Yt+1 = At+1Gt (kt)
where Yt+1 denotes output at time t+1, Gt is a strictly increasing, concave, and
Ft-measurable function, and At+1 is stochastic conditional on Ft and further
specified below.
Let βt ∈ (0, 1) be a discount factor and F (ct+j) a strictly increasing and con-
cave one-period utility function, and yt ≡ log Yt. Given observed initial values(
y0, µ̂0, σ̂
2
p,0, z0
)
and an initial value of the hidden state µ0 that is unobserved
by the decision maker, we consider the sequential problem to maximize
F (ct) + Et
∞∑
j=1
(
j−1∏
i=0
βt+i
)
F (ct+j) (26)
subject to
ct = Yt − kt − nt (ιt)
yt+1 = at+1 + logGt (kt)
at+1 = logAt+1 = ωa,t + µt+1 + σvεa,t+1
st+1 = µt+1 +
σv√
ιt
εs,t+1
µt+1 = ωµ,t + φµµt + σµ,tεµ,t+1, 0 ≤ φµ < 1
µ̂t+1 = ωµ,t + φµ
σ2v,tµ̂t + σ̂
2
t (at+1 − ωa,t) + σ̂2t ιtst+1(
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
)
σ̂2p,t+1 = φ
2
µ
σ̂2t σ
2
v,t(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + σ̂
2
t ιt
)
σ̂2t = σ
2
µ,t + σ̂
2
p,t
zt+1 = ωz + φzzt + σzεz,t+1
σ2µ,t = σ
2
µ,t (zt) > 0
kt ≥ 0
ιt, Yt > 0
where E [ ·| Ft] denotes the mathematical expectation, given the information set
Ft, nt (ιt) denotes a Ft−measurable, strictly increasing and convex function
which satisfies n′t (ιt)|ιt=0 = 0 for all t, σ
2
µ,t (zt) is a Ft−measurable, positive-
valued function of the state zt, and εt = (εa,t, εs,t, εµ,t, εz,t)
′
an i.i.d. Gaussian
shock process with mean zero and identity covariance matrix. The process {µt}
is not observed by the decision maker. Associated with this problem is the
Bellman equation
V (xt) = max
ut=(kt,ιt)
′
{F (ct) + βtE [V (xt+1) |Ft]} (27)
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with the state vector xt ≡
(
yt, µ̂t, σ̂
2
p,t, zt
)′
, the vector of controls ut≡ (kt, ιt)′,
and where V (xt) denotes the optimal value of the objective function starting
from state xt. The state vector transition equations xt+1 = h (xt,ut, at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
may be written as follows:
yt+1 = at+1 + logGt (kt)
µ̂t+1 = φµ
at+1−ωa,t+ιtst+1+
σ2v
σ̂2t
µ̂t
1+ιt+
σ2v
σ̂2t
σ̂2p,t+1 = φ
2
µ
σ2v
1+ιt+
σ2v
σ̂2t
zt+1 = ωz + φzzt + σzεz,t+1
The first-order necessary conditions for the problem on the right side of equation
(27) is
∫
∂x′t+1
∂ut
∂V (xt+1)
∂xt+1
fa,s,εz (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1|xt,ut) dλ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1) +∫
V (xt+1)
∂fa,s,εz (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1|xt,ut)
∂ut
dλ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
=
F ′ (ct)
βt
(
1
n′t (ιt)
)
with Lebesgue measure λ and fa,s,εz (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1|Ft) denoting the joint
conditional probability density function of the vector (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
. Note
that due to the given independence assumptions one may write
∂fa,s,εz (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1|xt,ut)
∂ut
=
(
0
∂fa,s(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)
∂ιt
)
· fεz (εz,t+1|Ft) .
Further,
∂x′t+1
∂ut
=
∂h (xt,ut, at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
∂ut
=

G′t(kt)
Gt(kt)
0 0 0
0 ∂µ̂t+1∂ιt
∂σ2p,t+1
∂ιt
0

Euler Equation
By the envelope theorem one obtains
∂V (xt)
∂yt
= F ′ (ct) · Yt
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which yields the familiar Euler equation
βtE
[
G′t (kt)
Gt (kt)
∂V ′ (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft] = F ′ (ct)
βtE [At+1G
′
t (kt)F
′ (ct+1)| Ft] = F ′ (ct)
A.2 Basic Formulas
This section gives the derivation of some basic formulas that are used in the
derivation of the first-order necessary condition for ιt.
Kalman Filter
The hidden state µt+1 evolves according to the stationary Markov process
µt+1 = ωµ,t + φµµt + σµ,tεµ,t+1,
the signals are given by(
at+1
st+1
)
=
(
ωa,t
0
)
+ µt+1 · 1 +
(
σv,t 0
0
σv,t√
ιt
)(
εa,t+1
εs,t+1
)
,
where 1 denotes a 2×1 vector of ones, (εa,t, εµ,t, εs,t)′ is an i.i.d. Gaussian shock
process with mean zero and identity covariance matrix, and ιt > 0. Define the
notation
σ̂2t ≡ V ar [µt+1|Ft]
µ̂t ≡ E [µt+1|Ft]
where Ft denotes the information set at time t which contains the history of
signals (at, st). Further let N
(
µ̂0, σ̂
2
0
)
be the initial distribution of µ. The
conditional moments
(
µ̂t, σ̂
2
t
)
are given by the recursion
µ̂t = ωµ,t−1 + φµ
σ2v,t−1µ̂t−1 + σ̂
2
t−1 (at − ωa,t−1) + σ̂2t−1ιt−1st(
σ̂2t−1 + σ̂
2
t−1ιt−1 + σ
2
v,t−1
)
σ̂2t = σ
2
µ,t + φ
2
µ
σ̂2t−1σ
2
v,t−1(
σ̂2t−1 + σ
2
v,t−1 + σ̂
2
t−1ιt−1
) .
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Some Useful Derivatives
∂µ̂t+1
(
at+1, st+1, µ̂t, σ̂
2
t , ιt
)
∂ιt
=
∂
{
ωµ,t + φµ
σ2v,tµ̂t+σ̂
2
t (at+1−ωa,t)+σ̂
2
t ιtst+1
(σ̂2t+σ̂2t ιt+σ2v,t)
}
∂ιt
= φµσ̂
2
t
(
σ2v,t + σ̂
2
t
)
(st+1 − µ̂t)− σ̂2t (at+1 − ωa,t − µ̂t)(
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
)2
∂ ∂µ̂t+1∂ιt
∂at+1
= − φµσ̂
4
t(
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
)2
∂ ∂µ̂t+1∂ιt
∂st+1
=
φµσ̂
2
t
(
σ2v,t + σ̂
2
t
)(
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
)2
∂µ̂t+1
(
at+1, st+1, µ̂t, σ̂
2
t , ιt
)
∂µ̂t
=
∂
{
ωµ,t + φµ
σ2v,tµ̂t+σ̂
2
t (at+1−ωa,t)+σ̂
2
t ιtst+1
(σ̂2t+σ̂2t ιt+σ2v,t)
}
∂µ̂t
= φµ
σ2v,t
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
∂µ̂t+1
(
at+1, st+1, µ̂t, σ̂
2
t , ιt
)
∂σ̂2t
=
∂
{
ωµ,t + φµ
σ2v,tµ̂t+σ̂
2
t (at+1−ωa,t)+σ̂
2
t ιtst+1
(σ̂2t+σ̂2t ιt+σ2v,t)
}
∂σ̂2t
= φµσ
2
v,t
(at+1 − (µ̂t + ωa,t)) + ιt (st+1 − µ̂t)(
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
)2
∂σ̂2t+1
(
σ̂2t , ιt
)
∂σ̂2t
=
{
σ2µ,t + φ
2
µ
σ̂2t−1σ
2
v,t−1
(σ̂2t−1+σ2v,t−1+σ̂2t−1ιt−1)
}
∂σ̂2t
= φ2µ
σ4v(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + σ̂
2
t ιt
)2
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∂σ̂2t+1
(
σ̂2t , ιt
)
∂ιt
=
{
σ2µ,t + φ
2
µ
σ̂2t−1σ
2
v,t−1
(σ̂2t−1+σ2v,t−1+σ̂2t−1ιt−1)
}
∂ιt
= −φ2µ
σ2v,t(
1 + ιt +
σ2v,t
σ̂2t
)2
∂2σ̂2t+1
(
σ̂2t , ιt
)
∂ι2t
= 2φ2µσ
2
v,t
(
1 + ιt +
σ2v,t
σ̂2t
)−3
−
∂2σ̂2t+1
∂ι2t
∂σ̂2t+1
∂ιt
=
2
1 + ιt +
σ2v,t
σ̂2t
A.3 Lemmas
Lemma 1. Let f (at+1, st+1|Ft) denote the conditional joint density of the vec-
tor (at+1, st+1)
′
. Then the following equality holds:
∂f(at+1,st+1|Ft)
∂ιt
f (at+1, st+1|Ft)
= − 1
2σ2v,t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
)2 ·{(
(at+1 − E [at+1|Ft]) σ̂2t − (st+1 − E [st+1|Ft])
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
))2−
V ar
[
at+1σ̂
2
t − st+1
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
|Ft
]}
Proof. Conditional on Ft the vector (at+1, st+1)′ is jointly normal with variance-
covariance matrix:
V ar (at+1, st+1|Ft) =
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t σ̂
2
t
σ̂2t σ̂
2
t +
σ2v,t
ιt
)
with
det [V ar (at+1, st+1|Ft)]
=
σ2v,t
ιt
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + σ̂
2
t ιt
)
and
V ar (at+1, st+1|Ft)−1 =
ιt
σ2v,t
(
σ̂2t +
σ2v,t
ιt
−σ̂2t
−σ̂2t σ̂t + σ2v,t
)
(
σ̂2t + ιtσ̂
2
t + σ
2
v,t
) .
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Define
∂f(at+1,st+1|Ft)
∂ιt
f (at+1, st+1|Ft)
=
∂
∂ιt
exp{Υ}
2π det[V ar(at+1,st+1|Ft)]0.5
f (at+1, st+1|Ft)
where the following definition applies:
Υ
(
at+1, st+1, ιt, σ̂
2
t , µ̂t
)
≡ −1
2
(
at+1 − E [at+1|Ft]
st+1 − E [st+1|Ft]
)′
V ar (at+1, st+1|Ft)−1 ·(
at+1 − E [at+1|Ft]
st+1 − E [st+1|Ft]
)
= − 1
2σ2v,t
(
σ̂2t + ιtσ̂
2
t + σ
2
v,t
) ·{(
ιtσ̂
2
t + σ
2
v,t
)
(at+1 − E [at+1|Ft])2 +
ιt
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
(st+1 − E [st+1|Ft])2 −
2σ̂2t ιt (at+1 − E [at+1|Ft]) (st+1 − E [st+1|Ft])
}
.
To determine
∂f(at+1,st+1|Ft)
∂ιt
f(at+1,st+1|Ft) , consider the derivative
∂Υ
(
at+1, st+1, ιt, σ̂
2
t , µ̂t
)
∂ιt
= −1
2
(
σ̂2t (at+1 − E [at+1|Ft])−
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
(st+1 − E [st+1|Ft])
)2
σ2v,t
(
σ̂2t + ιtσ̂
2
t + σ
2
v,t
)2
Note that
1
2
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
ιt
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + σ̂
2
t ιt
)
=
1
2
V ar
[
at+1σ̂
2
t − st+1
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
|Ft
]
σ2v,t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + σ̂
2
t ιt
)2
where
V ar
[
at+1σ̂
2
t − st+1
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
|Ft
]
= σ̂4t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
+
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)2(
σ̂2t +
σ2v,t
ιt
)
− 2σ̂4t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
= σ2v,t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)( σ̂2t
ιt
+
σ2v,t
ιt
+ σ̂2t
)
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In addition, one may write
1
2π det [V ar (at+1, st+1|Ft)]0.5
=
1
2π
(
σ2v,t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + σ̂
2
t ιt
)
ιt
)−0.5
Taking the derivative w.r.t. ιt yields
∂
∂ιt
{
1
2π det [V ar (at+1, st+1|Ft)]0.5
}
=
∂
∂ιt
 12π
(
σ2v,t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + σ̂
2
t ιt
)
ιt
)−0.5
=
σ̂2t+σ
2
v,t
2ιt(σ̂2t+σ2v,t+σ̂2t ιt)
2π det [V ar (at+1, st+1|Ft)]0.5
=
V ar[at+1σ̂2t−st+1(σ̂
2
t+σ
2
v,t)|Ft]
2σ2v,t(σ̂2t+σ2v,t+σ̂2t ιt)
2
2π det [V ar (at+1, st+1|Ft)]0.5
Taking these results together yields the stated relation.
Lemma 2.
∂f(at+1,st+1|Ft)
∂µ̂t
f (at+1, st+1|Ft)
=
(at+1 − µ̂t − ωa,t) + ιt (st+1 − µ̂t)
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
.
Proof. To determine
∂f(at+1,st+1|Ft)
∂µ̂t
f(at+1,st+1|Ft) consider the derivative
∂Υ
(
at+1, st+1, ιt, σ̂
2
t , µ̂t
)
∂µ̂t
=
(at+1 − µ̂t − ωa,t) + ιt (st+1 − µ̂t)
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
The result directly follows.
Lemma 3.
∂f(at+1,st+1|Ft)
∂σ̂2p,t
f (at+1, st+1|Ft)
=
1
2
((at+1 − E [at+1|Ft]) + ιt (st+1 − E [st+1|Ft]))2(
σ̂2t + ιtσ̂
2
t + σ
2
v,t
)2 −
1
2
V ar [at+1 + ιtst+1|Ft](
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + σ̂
2
t ιt
)2
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Proof. Consider the derivative
∂Υ
(
at+1, st+1, ιt, σ̂
2
t , µ̂t
)
∂σ̂2p,t
=
1
2
((at+1 − E [at+1|Ft]) + ιt (st+1 − E [st+1|Ft]))2(
σ̂2t + ιtσ̂
2
t + σ
2
v,t
)2
and
∂
∂σ̂2p,t
{
1
2π det [V ar (at+1, st+1|Ft)]0.5
}
=
∂
∂σ̂2t
 12π
(
σ2v,t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + σ̂
2
t ιt
)
ιt
)− 12
=
1
2π
(
σ2v,t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + σ̂
2
t ιt
)
ιt
)− 12 (
−1
2
)
(1 + ιt)(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + σ̂
2
t ιt
)
=
− 12
(1+ιt)
(σ̂2t+σ2v,t+σ̂2t ιt)
2π det [V ar (at+1, st+1|Ft)]0.5
=
− 12
(1+ιt)(σ̂2t+σ
2
v,t+σ̂
2
t ιt)
(σ̂2t+σ2v,t+σ̂2t ιt)
2
2π det [V ar (at+1, st+1|Ft)]0.5
Thus, one may verify the result
∂f(at+1,st+1|Ft)
∂σ̂2p,t
f (at+1, st+1|Ft)
=
1
2
((at+1 − E [at+1|Ft]) + ιt (st+1 − E [st+1|Ft]))2(
σ̂2t + ιtσ̂
2
t + σ
2
v,t
)2 −
1
2
(1 + ιt)
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + σ̂
2
t ιt
)(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + σ̂
2
t ιt
)2
where
(1 + ιt)
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
)
= V ar [at+1 + ιtst+1|Ft] .
The following Lemmas make use of the following condition and definitions:
Condition 1. The function Ω (x) satisfies the following conditions
1. Ω (x) is a function of the state vector x only,
2. Ω (h (a, s, εz)) is everywhere differentiable,
3. Et
[∣∣∣∂h′(a,s,εz)∂(a,s,εz)′ ∂Ω(x)∂x ∣∣∣] <∞.
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Definitions
ζ∂yt,t+1 ≡
(at+1 − st+1 − ωa,t)
σ2v,t
ζ∂µ̂t,t+1 ≡
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
(st+1 − Et [st+1])− σ̂2t (at+1 − Et [at+1])
φµσ̂2t σ
2
v,t
ζ∂µ̂
2
t,t+1 ≡
(
(at+1 − Et [at+1]) σ̂2t − (st+1 − Et [st+1])
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
))2
φ2µσ̂
4
t σ
4
v,t
−
V art
[
at+1σ̂
2
t − st+1
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)]
φ2µσ̂
4
t σ
4
v,t
It may be verified that
Et
[
ζ∂yt,t+1
]
= Et
[
ζ∂µ̂t,t+1
]
= Et
[
ζ∂µ̂
2
t,t+1
]
= 0
and
Covt
[
ζ∂µ̂t,t+1, (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
]
=
 0σ̂2t ιt+σ̂2t+σ2v,t
φµιtσ̂2t
0

′
Covt
[
ζ∂yt,t+1, (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
]
=
 1− 1ιt
0
′
Lemma 4. Let Ω be a function that satisfies condition (1) then
E
[
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft] = E [ζ∂yt,t+1Ω (xt+1)∣∣∣Ft] .
Proof. Since ζ∂yt,t+1 and the vector (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
are jointly normal condi-
tional on Ft one may write by the multivariate version of Stein’s Lemma
E
[
(at+1 − st+1 − ωa,t)
σ2v,t
Ω (xt+1)
∣∣∣∣Ft]
=
 1− 1ιt
0
′ ∂x′t+1
∂ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′E
[
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂xt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]́
= E
[
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
where
∂x′t+1
∂ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′ =

1
φµσ̂
2
t
σ̂2t+σ̂
2
t ιt+σ
2
v,t
0 0
0
φµσ̂
2
t ιt
σ̂2t+σ̂
2
t ιt+σ
2
v,t
0 0
0 0 0 σz
 . (28)
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Lemma 5. Let Ω be a function that satisfies condition (1) then
E
[
ζ∂µ̂t,t+1Ω (xt+1)
∣∣∣Ft] = E [ ∂Ω (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Proof. By the multivariate version of Stein’s Lemma
E
[
ζ∂µ̂t,t+1Ω (xt+1)
∣∣∣Ft]
= Cov
[
ζ∂µ̂t,t+1,Ω (xt+1)
∣∣∣Ft]
=
 0σ̂2t+σ̂2t ιt+σ2v,t
φµσ̂2t ιt
0

′
∂x′t+1
∂ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′E
[
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂xt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= E
[
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Lemma 6. Let Ω be a function that satisfies condition (1) then
E [ (at+1 − E [at+1|Ft]) Ω (xt+1)| Ft]
=
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
E
[
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ φµσ̂2tE [ ∂Ω (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Proof. By the multivariate version of Stein’s Lemma one may write
E [ (at+1 − E [at+1|Ft]) Ω (xt+1)| Ft]
=
 σ̂2t + σ2v,tσ̂2t
0
′ ∂x′t+1
∂ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
E
[
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂xt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
=
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
E
[
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ φµσ̂2tE [ ∂Ω (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Lemma 7. Let Ω be a function that satisfies condition (1) then
E [ (st+1 − E [st+1|Ft]) Ω (xt+1)| Ft]
= σ̂2tE
[
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ φµσ̂2tE [ ∂Ω (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Proof. By the multivariate version of Stein’s Lemma one may write
E [ (st+1 − E [st+1|Ft]) Ω (xt+1)| Ft]
=
 σ̂
2
t
σ̂2t +
σ2v,t
ιt
0

′
∂x′t+1
∂ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
E
[
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂xt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= σ̂2tE
[
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ φµσ̂2tE [ ∂Ω (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
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Lemma 8. Let Ω be a function that satisfies condition (1) then
Et
[
ζ∂µ̂
2
t,t+1Ω (xt+1)
]
= Et
[
∂2Ω (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
]
(29)
Proof. Since ζ∂µ̂
2
t,t+1 is not conditionally jointly normal with the vector (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
consider the decomposition(
(at+1 − Et [at+1]) σ̂2t − (st+1 − Et [st+1])
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
))2
=
(
(at+1 − Et [at+1])
(st+1 − Et [st+1])
)′
·( (
σ̂2t
)2
(at+1 − Et [at+1])− σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
(st+1 − Et [st+1])(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)2
(st+1 − Et [st+1])− σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
(at+1 − Et [at+1])
)
Then, one may write
Et
[
V (xt+1)
(
(at+1 − Et [at+1]) σ̂2t − (st+1 − Et [st+1])
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
))2]
= Covt
[(
σ̂2t
)2
at+1 − σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
st+1,Ω (xt+1) (at+1 − Et [at+1])
]
+
Covt
[(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)2
st+1 − σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
at+1,Ω (xt+1) (st+1 − Et [st+1])
]
First, consider
Covt
[(
σ̂2t
)2
at+1 − σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
st+1,Ω (xt+1) (at+1 − Et [at+1])
]
= Covt
[(
σ̂2t
)2
at+1 − σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
st+1, (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
]
·
Et
[
∂x′t+1
∂ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂xt+1
(at+1 − Et [at+1])
]
+
Covt
[(
σ̂2t
)2
at+1 − σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
st+1, (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
]
·
Et
[
∂ (at+1 − E [at+1|Ft])
∂ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′ Ω (xt+1)
]
Substituting
Covt
[(
σ̂2t
)2
at+1 − σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
st+1, (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
]
=
 0− σ̂2tσ2v,t(σ̂2t+σ2v,t+σ̂2t ιt)ιt
0

′
and rearranging yields
Covt
[(
σ̂2t
)2
at+1 − σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
st+1,Ω (xt+1) (at+1 − Et [at+1])
]
= −φµσ2v,tσ̂4tEt
[
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
(at+1 − Et [at+1])
]
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Given that ∂Ω(xt+1)∂µ̂t+1 satisfies condition (1) one may write by Lemma (6)
Et
[
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
(at+1 − Et [at+1])
]
=
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
Et
[
∂2Ω (xt+1)
∂yt+1∂µ̂t+1
]
+ φµσ̂
2
tEt
[
∂2Ω (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
]
which yields
Covt
[(
σ̂2t
)2
at+1 − σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
st+1,Ω (xt+1) (at+1 − Et [at+1])
]
= −φµσ2v,tσ̂4t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
Et
[
∂2Ω (xt+1)
∂yt+1∂µ̂t+1
]
−
φ2µσ
2
v,tσ̂
6
tEt
[
∂2Ω (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
]
Next, consider the term
Covt
[(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)2
st+1 − σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
at+1,Ω (xt+1) (st+1 − Et [st+1])
]
= Covt
[(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)2
st+1 − σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
at+1, (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
]
·
Et
[
∂x′t+1
∂ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂xt+1
(st+1 − Et [st+1])
]
+
Covt
[(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)2
st+1 − σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
at+1, (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
]
·
Et
[
∂ (st+1 − Et [st+1])
∂ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′Ω (xt+1)
]
Substituting
Covt
[(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)2
st+1 − σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
at+1, (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
]
=
 0σ2v,t(σ̂2t+σ2v,t)(σ̂2t+σ2v,t+ιtσ̂2t )
ιt
0

′
and rearranging yields
Covt
[(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)2
st+1 − σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
at+1,Ω (xt+1) (st+1 − Et [st+1])
]
=
σ2v,t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
) (
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
)
ιt
·(
φµσ̂
2
t ιt
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
Et
[
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
(st+1 − Et [st+1])
]
+ Et [Ω (xt+1)]
)
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Given that ∂Ω(xt+1)∂µ̂t+1 satisfies condition (1) one may write by Lemma (7)
Et
[
∂Ω (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
(st+1 − Et [st+1])
]
= σ̂2tEt
[
∂2Ω (xt+1)
∂yt+1∂µ̂t+1
]
+ φµσ̂
2
tEt
[
∂2Ω (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
]
which yields
Covt
[(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)2
st+1 − σ̂2t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
at+1,Ω (xt+1) (st+1 − Et [st+1])
]
= φµσ
2
v,t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
σ̂4tEt
[
∂2Ω (xt+1)
∂yt+1∂µ̂t+1
]
+
φ2µσ
2
v,t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
σ̂4tEt
[
∂2Ω (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
]
+
σ2v,t
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
) (
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
)
ιt
Et [Ω (xt+1)]
Substituting these results yields
Et
[
Ω (xt+1)
(
(at+1 − Et [at+1]) σ̂2t − (st+1 − Et [st+1])
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
))2]
= φ2µσ̂
4
t σ
4
v,tEt
[
∂2Ω (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
]
+
V art
[
at+1σ̂
2
t − st+1
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)]
· Et [Ω (xt+1)]
since
V art
[
at+1σ̂
2
t − st+1
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)]
=
σ2v,t ·
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
·
(
ιtσ̂
2
t + σ̂
2
t + σ
2
v,t
)
ιt
.
Thus, one obtains
Et
[
ζ∂µ̂
2
t,t+1Ω (xt+1)
]
=
Et
[(
(at+1 − Et [at+1]) σ̂2t − (st+1 − Et [st+1])
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
))2
Ω (xt+1)
]
φ2µσ̂
4
t σ
4
v,t
−
V art
[
at+1σ̂
2
t − st+1
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)]
φ2µσ̂
4
t σ
4
v,t
Et [Ω (xt+1)]
= Et
[
∂2Ω (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
]
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Lemma 9. Given the value function V (xt+1) satisfies condition (1) the follow-
ing equality holds:
E
[
V (xt+1)
∂f(at+1,st+1|Ft)
∂µ̂t
f (at+1, st+1|Ft)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= E
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ (1 + ιt) σ̂2tσ̂2t + σ2v,t + ιtσ̂2t φµE
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Proof. Using the previously derived representation of
∂f(at+1,st+1|Ft)
∂µ̂t
f(at+1,st+1|Ft) one may
write
E
[
V (xt+1)
∂f(at+1,st+1|Ft)
∂µ̂t
f (at+1, st+1|Ft)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
=
Et [V (xt+1) (at+1 − Et [at+1|])] + ιtEt [V (xt+1) (st+1 − µ̂t)]
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
Given that V (xt+1) satisfies condition (1) one may write by Lemma (6) and
Lemma (7) :
E [ (at+1 − E [at+1|Ft])V (xt+1)| Ft]
=
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
E
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣Ft]+ φµσ̂2tE [ ∂V (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1 ∣∣∣Ft]
E [ (st+1 − E [st+1|Ft])V (xt+1)| Ft]
= σ̂2tE
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣Ft]+ φµσ̂2tE [ ∂V (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1 ∣∣∣Ft]
Substituting these results and gathering common terms yields
E
[
V (xt+1)
∂f(at+1,st+1|Ft)
∂µ̂t
f (at+1, st+1|Ft)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= E
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ (1 + ιt) σ̂2tσ̂2t + σ2v,t + ιtσ̂2t φµE
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Lemma 10. The shadow value of µ̂ has the following recursive representation:
∂V (xt)
∂µ̂t
= βtE
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ φµβtE [ ∂V (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
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Proof. By the envelope theorem one may write ∂V (xt)∂µ̂t as follows
∂V (xt)
∂µ̂t
= βtE
[
∂h′t+1
∂µ̂t
∂V (xt+1)
∂xt+1
+ V (xt+1)
∂f(at+1,st+1|Ft)
∂µ̂t
f (at+1, st+1|Ft)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= βtE
[
∂µ̂t+1
∂µ̂t
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
+ V (xt+1)
∂f(at+1,st+1|Ft)
∂µ̂t
f (at+1, st+1|Ft)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
since
∂h′t+1
∂µ̂t
=

0
∂µ̂t+1
∂µ̂t
0
0

′
where
∂f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)
∂µ̂t
f (at+1, st+1|xt,ut)
=
(at+1 − µ̂t − ωa,t) + ιt (st+1 − µ̂t)
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
as defined and derived above. Since, as shown above, ∂µ̂t+1∂µ̂t is Ft−measurable
one may further write
∂V (xt)
∂µ̂t
(30)
= βt
∂µ̂t+1
∂µ̂t
E
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ βtE
[
V (xt+1)
∂f(at+1,st+1|Ft)
∂µ̂t
f (at+1, st+1|Ft)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
Further, using Lemma (9) and the previously derived representation for ∂µ̂t+1∂µ̂t ,
∂µ̂t+1
∂µ̂t
= φµ
σ2v,t
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
,
one may write equation (30) as follows
∂V (xt)
∂µ̂t
= βtφµ
σ2v,t
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
E
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
βtE
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
βtφµ
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
E
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
This yields
∂V (xt)
∂µ̂t
= βtE
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ φµβtE [ ∂V (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft] . (31)
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Lemma 11.
E
[
∂µ̂t+1
∂ιt
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
|Ft
]
= −
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∂ιt
E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
|Ft
]
. (32)
Proof. Note that given the previous definitions one may write
∂µ̂t+1
∂ιt
= −
∂σ2p,t+1
∂ιt
· ζ∂µ̂t,t+1.
Given that ∂V (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1 satisfies condition (1) , one directly obtains the stated result
by applying Lemma (5) .
Lemma 12. Define V RS (xt,u (xt)) as the right side of equation (27) evaluated
at the optimal policy function u (xt).
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
has the following representation:
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
= βt+1E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂y2t+2
∣∣∣∣Ft+1]+ (33)
φ2µβt+1E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂µ̂2t+2
∣∣∣∣Ft+1]+
2φµβt+1E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂yt+2∂µ̂t+2
∣∣∣∣Ft+1]+
2
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂µ̂t+1∂u (xt+1)
∂u (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
+
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂2u (xt+1)
(
∂u (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
)2
.
Proof. Moving equation (31) one period forward and differentiating w.r.t. µ̂t+1
yields
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
=
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂µ̂2t+1
+ 2
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂µ̂t+1∂u (xt+1)
∂u (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
+
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂2u (xt+1)
(
∂u (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
)2
By differentiating (31) w.r.t. µ̂t+1 one obtains
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂µ̂2t+1
= βt+1
∂E
[
∂V (xt+2)
∂yt+2
∣∣∣Ft+1]
∂µ̂t+1
+φµβt+1
∂E
[
∂V (xt+2)
∂µ̂t+2
∣∣∣Ft+1]
∂µ̂t+1
(34)
First, consider the term
∂E
[
∂V (xt+2)
∂yt+2
∣∣∣Ft+1]
∂µ̂t+1
(35)
= E
 ∂ ∂V (xt+2)∂yt+2
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft+1
+ E
 ∂V (xt+2)
∂yt+2
∂f(at+2,st+2|xt+1,ut+1)
∂µ̂t+1
f (at+2, st+2|xt+1,ut+1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft+1

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Note that
E
 ∂ ∂V (xt+2)∂yt+2
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft+1

= E
 ∂h′t+2
∂µ̂t+1
∂ ∂V (xt+2)∂yt+2
∂xt+2
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft+1

=
φµσ
2
v,t+1
σ̂2t+1 + σ̂
2
t+1ιt+1 + σ
2
v,t+1
· E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂yt+2∂µ̂t+2
∣∣∣∣Ft+1]
since
∂ht+2
∂µ̂t+1
=

0
φµσ
2
v,t+1
σ̂2t+1+σ̂
2
t+1ιt+1+σ
2
v,t+1
0
0
 . (36)
Next, consider the second addend
E
 ∂f(at+2,st+2|xt+1,ut+1)∂µ̂t+1
f (at+2, st+2|xt+1,ut+1)
∂V (xt+2)
∂yt+2
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft+1

=
Et
[
∂V (xt+2)
∂yt+2
(at+1 − Et [at+1|])
]
+ ιt · Et
[
∂V (xt+2)
∂yt+2
(st+1 − µ̂t)
]
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
Given that ∂V (xt+2)∂yt+2 satisfies condition (1) one may apply Lemma (6) and
Lemma (7) to obtain:
E
[
(at+2 − E [at+2|Ft+1]) ∂V (xt+2)∂yt+2
∣∣∣Ft+1]
=
(
σ̂2t+1 + σ
2
v,t+1
)
E
[
∂
∂V (xt+2)
∂yt+2
∂yt+2
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+ φµσ̂
2
t+1E
[
∂
∂V (xt+2)
∂yt+2
∂µ̂t+2
∣∣∣∣∣Ft+1
]
E [ (st+2 − E [st+2|Ft+1])V (xt+2)| Ft+1]
= σ̂2t+1E
[
∂
∂V (xt+2)
∂yt+2
∂yt+2
∣∣∣∣∣Ft+1
]
+ φµσ̂
2
t+1E
[
∂
∂V (xt+2)
∂yt+2
∂µ̂t+2
∣∣∣∣∣Ft+1
]
Substituting these results and gathering common terms yields
E
[
∂f(at+2,st+2|Ft+1)
∂µ̂t+1
f(at+2,st+2|Ft+1)
∂V (xt+2)
∂yt+2
∣∣∣∣∣Ft+1
]
= E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂y2t+2
∣∣∣Ft]+ φµ (1+ιt+1)σ̂2t+1σ̂2t+1+σ2v,t+1+ιt+1σ̂2t+1E [ ∂2V (xt+2)∂yt+2∂µ̂t+1 ∣∣∣Ft]
(37)
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Substituting these results into eqn. (35) and gathering common terms yields
∂E
[
∂V (xt+2)
∂yt+2
∣∣∣Ft+1]
∂µ̂t+1
(38)
= E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂y2t+2
∣∣∣∣Ft+1]+ φµE [ ∂2V (xt+2)∂yt+2∂µ̂t+2
∣∣∣∣Ft+1]
Next, consider the term
∂E
[
∂V (xt+2)
∂µ̂t+2
∣∣∣Ft+1]
∂µ̂t+1
= E
 ∂ ∂V (xt+2)∂µ̂t+2
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft+1
+ E
 ∂V (xt+2)
∂µ̂t+2
∂f(at+2,st+2|Ft+1)
∂µ̂t+1
f (at+2, st+2|Ft+1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft+1

where, using (36), the first addend may be written as follows
E
 ∂ ∂V (xt+2)∂µ̂t+2
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft+1

= E
 ∂h′t+2
∂µ̂t+1
∂ ∂V (xt+2)∂µ̂t+2
∂xt+2
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft+1

=
φµσ
2
v,t+1
σ̂2t+1 + σ̂
2
t+1ιt+1 + σ
2
v,t+1
E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂µ̂2t+2
∣∣∣∣Ft+1]
Further, analogous to (37) , one may write the second addend by Lemma (6)
and Lemma (7) as follows:
E
[
∂f(at+2,st+2|Ft+1)
∂µ̂t+1
f(at+2,st+2|Ft+1)
∂V (xt+2)
∂µ̂t+2
∣∣∣∣∣Ft+1
]
= E
[
∂
∂V (xt+2)
∂µ̂t+2
∂yt+2
∣∣∣∣∣Ft+1
]
+ φµ
(1+ιt+1)σ̂
2
t+1
σ̂2t+1+σ
2
v,t+1+σ̂
2
t+1ιt+1
E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂µ̂2t+2
∣∣∣Ft+1]
Substituting the results for the two addends yields
dE
[
∂V (xt+2)
∂µ̂t+2
∣∣∣Ft+1]
dµ̂t+1
(39)
= E
 ∂ ∂V (xt+2)∂µ̂t+2
∂yt+2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ φµE [ ∂2V (xt+2)
∂µ̂2t+2
∣∣∣∣Ft+1]
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Substituting (39) and (38) into (34) and gathering common terms yields
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂µ̂2t+1
= βt+1E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂y2t+2
∣∣∣∣Ft+1]+
φ2µβt+1E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂µ̂2t+2
∣∣∣∣Ft+1]+
2φµβt+1E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂yt+2∂µ̂t+2
∣∣∣∣Ft+1]
which yields the stated relation.
Lemma 13.
E
V (xt+1) ∂f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)∂σ̂2p,t
f (at+1, st+1|xt,ut)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

=
1
2
· E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂y2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
1
2
φ2µ
(1 + ιt)
2
σ̂4t(
σ̂2t (1 + ιt) + σ
2
v,t
)2E [ ∂2V (xt+1)∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
φµ
(1 + ιt) σ̂
2
t(
σ̂2t (1 + ιt) + σ
2
v,t
) · E [ ∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Proof. Note that one may write
∂f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)
∂σ̂2p,t
f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut) as follows:
∂f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)
∂σ̂2p,t
f (at+1, st+1|xt,ut)
=
1
2
1(
σ̂2t (1 + ιt) + σ
2
v,t
)2
{(
at+1 − E [at+1|Ft]
st+1 − E [st+1|Ft]
)′
·(
(at+1 − E [at+1|Ft]) + ιt (st+1 − E [st+1|Ft])
ιt (at+1 − E [at+1|Ft]) + ιt (st+1 − E [st+1|Ft])
)
−
V ar [at+1 + ιtst+1|Ft]}
This decomposition is helpful since
∂f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)
∂σ̂2p,t
f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut) is not conditionally normal.
Further, define the vector(
V̄t,1 (xt+1, at+1)
V̄t,2 (xt+1, st+1)
)
≡ V (xt+1)
(
(at+1 − E [at+1|Ft])
(st+1 − E [st+1|Ft])
)
. (40)
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Then one may write
E
V (xt+1) ∂f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)∂σ̂2p,t
f (at+1, st+1|xt,ut)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

=
1
2
1(
σ̂2t (1 + ιt) + σ
2
v,t
)2 ·{
Cov
[
at+1 + ιtst+1, V̄t,1 (xt+1, at+1)
∣∣Ft]+
Cov
[
ιtat+1 + ιtst+1, V̄t,2 (xt+1, st+1)
∣∣Ft]−
V ar [at+1 + ιtst+1|Ft]E [V (xt+1)| Ft]}
which allows the application of the multivariate version of Stein’s Lemma. First,
consider
Cov
[
at+1 + ιtst+1, V̄t,1 (xt+1, at+1)
∣∣Ft]
= Cov
[
at+1 + ιtst+1, (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′∣∣Ft]
E

∂
(
xt+1
at+1
)′
∂ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
∂V̄t,1 (xt+1, at+1)
∂
(
xt+1
at+1
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

where
∂
(
xt+1
at+1
)′
∂ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′ =

1
φµσ̂
2
t
σ̂2t+σ̂
2
t ιt+σ
2
v,t
0 0 1
0
φµσ̂
2
t ιt
σ̂2t+σ̂
2
t ιt+σ
2
v,t
0 0 0
0 0 0 σz 0
 (41)
and
E
 ∂V̄t,1(xt+1,at+1)
∂
 xt+1
at+1

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

= E
[(
∂V (xt+1)
∂xt+1
(at+1 − E [at+1|Ft])
V (xt+1)
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
] (42)
and
Cov
[
at+1 + ιtst+1, (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′∣∣Ft]
=
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
) 11
0
′ . (43)
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Hence,
Cov
[
at+1 + ιtst+1, V̄t,1 (xt+1, at+1)
∣∣Ft]
=
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
)
·{
E
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
(at+1 − E [at+1|Ft])
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ E [V (xt+1)| Ft] +
φµ
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
E
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
(at+1 − E [at+1|Ft])
∣∣∣∣Ft]}
Further, given that ∂V (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1 satisfies condition (1) one may apply Lemma (6)
to obtain
Cov
[
at+1,
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft] (44)
=
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
φµσ̂
2
tE
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Substituting this result yields:
Cov
[
at+1 + ιtst+1, V̄t,1 (xt+1, at+1)
∣∣Ft]
=
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
)
·{
Cov
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
, at+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ E [V (xt+1)| Ft]}+
φµσ̂
2
t (1 + ιt) ·
{(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t
)
E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
φµσ̂
2
tE
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]}
Next, one may write
Cov
[
ιtat+1 + ιtst+1, V̄t,2 (xt+1, st+1)
∣∣Ft]
= Cov
[
ιtat+1 + ιtst+1, (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′∣∣Ft] ·
E

d
(
xt+1
st+1
)′
d (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′
∂V̄t,2 (xt+1, st+1)
∂
(
xt+1
st+1
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

Note that
∂
(
xt+1
st+1
)′
∂ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′ =

1
φµσ̂
2
t
σ̂2t+σ̂
2
t ιt+σ
2
v,t
0 0 0
0
φµσ̂
2
t ιt
σ̂2t+σ̂
2
t ιt+σ
2
v,t
0 0 1
0 0 0 σz 0
 (45)
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and
E
 ∂V̄t,2 (xt+1, st+1)
∂
(
xt+1
st+1
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

= E
[(
∂V (xt+1)
∂xt+1
(st+1 − E [st+1|Ft])
V (xt+1)
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
and
Cov
[
ιtat+1 + ιtst+1, (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
′∣∣Ft]
= ιt
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
)
·
 11
0
′
Therefore, one obtains
Cov
[
ιtat+1 + ιtst+1, V̄t,2 (xt+1, st+1)
∣∣Ft]
= ιt
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
)
·{
Cov
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
, st+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
φµ
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
Cov
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
, st+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
E [V (xt+1)| Ft]}
Further, given that ∂V (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1 satisfies condition (1) one may apply Lemma (7)
to obtain
Cov
[
st+1,
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft] (46)
= σ̂2tE
 ∂ ∂V (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft
+ φµσ̂2tE [ ∂2V (xt+1)∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
This yields
Cov
[
ιtat+1 + ιtst+1, V̄t,2 (xt+1, st+1)
∣∣Ft]
= ιt
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
)
·{
Cov
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
, st+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ E [V (xt+1)| Ft]}+
φ2µσ̂
2
t (1 + ιt) σ̂
2
t ιt · E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
φµσ̂
2
t (1 + ιt) σ̂
2
t ιtE
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
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Substituting the results into,
E
V (xt+1) ∂f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)∂σ̂2p,t
f (at+1, st+1|xt,ut)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

=
1
2
1(
σ̂2t (1 + ιt) + σ
2
v,t
)2 ·{
Cov
[
at+1 + ιtst+1, V̄t,1 (xt+1, at+1)
∣∣Ft]+
Cov
[
ιtat+1 + ιtst+1, V̄t,2 (xt+1, st+1)
∣∣Ft]−
V ar [at+1 + ιtst+1|Ft]E [V (xt+1)| Ft]}
yields
E
V (xt+1) ∂f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)∂σ̂2p,t
f (at+1, st+1|xt,ut)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

=
1
2
1(
σ̂2t (1 + ιt) + σ
2
v,t
)2 ·{(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
)
Cov
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
, at+1 + ιtst+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
(1 + ιt)
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
)
E [V (xt+1)| Ft] +
φµσ̂
2
t (1 + ιt)
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + σ̂
2
t ιt
)
E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
φ2µσ̂
4
t (1 + ιt)
2
E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]−
V ar [at+1 + ιtst+1|Ft]E [V (xt+1)| Ft]}
Finally, given that ∂V (xt+1)∂yt+1 satisfies condition (1) one may apply Lemmas (6)
and (7) to obtain
Cov
[
(at+1 + ιtst+1) ,
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
=
(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
)
· E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂y2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
φµσ̂
2
t (1 + ιt)E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂yt+1∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Using this result and
V ar [at+1 + ιtst+1|Ft]
= (1 + ιt)
(
ιtσ̂
2
t + σ
2
v,t + σ̂
2
t
)
,
yields the stated equation.
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Lemma 14.
E
[
∂µ̂t+1 (at+1, st+1|Ft)
∂σ̂2p,t
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
=
φµσ
2
v,t(
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
)E [ ∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
φ2µσ
2
v,t
(1 + ιt) σ̂
2
t(
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
)2 · E [ ∂2V (xt+1)∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Proof. Recall the previously derived formula
∂µ̂t+1
∂σ̂2p,t
=
∂µ̂t+1
∂σ̂2t
= φµσ
2
v,t
(at+1 − (µ̂t + ωa,t)) + ιt (st+1 − µ̂t)(
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
)2
Thus, one may write
E
[
∂µ̂t+1 (at+1, st+1|Ft)
∂σ̂2p,t
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
=
φµσ
2
v,t(
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
)2Cov [{at+1 + ιtst+1} , ∂V (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Given that ∂V (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1 satisfies condition (1) one may apply Lemmas (6) and (7)
to obtain the stated relation.
Lemma 15.
∂V (xt)
∂σ̂2p,t
(47)
= βtφµE
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
βtφ
2
µ (1 + ιt) σ̂
2
t
σ2v,t +
1
2 σ̂
2
t (1 + ιt)(
σ̂2t + σ̂
2
t ιt + σ
2
v,t
)2E [ ∂2V (xt+1)∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
βt
1
2
· E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂y2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
βtE
[
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∂σ̂2p,t
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
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Proof. By the envelope theorem one may write
∂V (xt)
∂σ̂2p,t
= βtE
[
∂x′t+1
∂σ̂2p,t
∂V (xt+1)
∂xt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
βtE
V (xt+1) ∂f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)∂σ̂2p,t
f (at+1, st+1|xt,ut)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

= βtE
[
∂µ̂t+1
∂σ̂2p,t
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
βtE
[
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∂σ̂2p,t
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+
βtE
V (xt+1) ∂f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)∂σ̂2p,t
f (at+1, st+1|xt,ut)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

since
βtE
[
∂yt+1
∂σ̂2p,t
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= βtE
[
∂zt+1
∂σ̂2p,t
∂V (xt+1)
∂zt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= 0
where
∂f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)
∂σ̂2p,t
f (at+1, st+1|xt,ut)
=
1
2
((at+1 − E [at+1|Ft]) + ιt (st+1 − E [st+1|Ft]))2
−V ar [at+1 + ιtst+1|Ft](
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
)2
as defined and derived above. Substituting the equations provided by Lemma
(14) and (13) and gathering common terms yields the stated equation.
Lemma 16.
Et
[
V (xt+1)
∂f(at+1,st+1|Ft)
∂ιt
f (at+1, st+1|Ft)
]
=
1
2
∂σ2p,t+1
∂ιt
Et
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
]
(48)
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Proof. Based on the previous definitions one may write
∂f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)
∂ιt
f (at+1, st+1|xt,ut)
= −1
2
φ2µ
σ̂4t σ
2
v,t(
σ̂2t + σ
2
v,t + ιtσ̂
2
t
)2 ζ∂µ̂2t,t+1
=
1
2
∂σ2p,t+1
∂ιt
ζ∂µ̂
2
t,t+1.
Applying Lemma (8) directly yields the stated equation.
A.4 Propositions
Proposition 5. The decision problem associated with the Bellman equation (27)
implies the following necessary intertemporal condition for optimal information
acquisition ι :
Et
[
mt+1
Πt+1 + δt+1MCt+1
(
σ̂2p,t+2
)
MCt
(
σ̂2p,t+1
) ] = 1
where mt,t+1 =
βtF
′(ct+1)
F ′(ct)
denotes the stochastic discount factor and the follow-
ing definitions apply
Πt+1 ≡
1
2
∂2V RS(xt+1,u(xt+1))
∂µ̂t+1∂kt+1
∂kt+1(xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
+ ∂
2V RS(xt+1,u(xt+1))
∂µ̂t+1∂ιt+1
∂ιt+1(xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
F ′ (ct+1)
MCt
(
σ̂2p,t+1
)
≡ n′t (ιt)
/
−
∂σ̂2p,t+1
(
σ̂2t , ιt
)
∂ιt
∂σ̂2p,t+1
(
σ̂2t , ιt
)
∂ιt
≡ −
φ2µσ
2
v,t(
1 + ιt +
σ2v,t
σ̂2t
)2
δt+1 ≡
∂σ̂2p,t+2
(
σ̂2t+1, ιt+1
)
∂σ̂2t+1
=
φ2µ(
1 + (1 + ιt+1)
σ̂2t+1
σ2v
)2
and where V RS
(
xt+1,ut+1
)
denotes the right side of the Bellman equation (27)
evaluated at the optimal policy rule u (xt+1).
Proof. Note that the first-order necessary condition for ιt, as derived above,
49
may be written as follows:
E
[
∂µ̂t+1
∂ιt
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ E
[
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∂ιt
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+ (49)
E
[
V (xt+1)
∂f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)
∂ιt
f (at+1, st+1|xt,ut)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
=
F ′ (ct)n
′
t (ιt)
βt
Substituting the previous results (32) and (48) , one obtains
−
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∂ιt
E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ ∂σ̂2p,t+1∂ιt E
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+
1
2
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∂ιt
E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
=
F ′ (ct)n
′
t (ιt)
βt
or
E
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
=
1
2
E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ F ′ (ct)n′t (ιt)∂σ̂2p,t+1
∂ιt
βt
(50)
Define
θt,σ̂2p,t ≡
1
2
βt · E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂y2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+
βtφµE
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
δt ≡
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∂σ̂2p,t
=
∂σ̂2t+1
∂σ̂2t
γt,σ̂2p,t ≡ βtφ
2
µ (1 + ιt) σ̂
2
t
σ2v,t +
1
2 (1 + ιt) σ̂
2
t(
σ̂2t (1 + ιt) + σ
2
v,t
)2
such that by (47) ∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
may be written as follows
∂V (xt)
∂σ̂2p,t
= θt,σ̂2p,t + βtδtE
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+ γt,σ̂2p,tE
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft] .
50
Substituting (50), rearranging, and going one period forward gives
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
= θt+1,σ̂2p,t+1 + βt+1δt+1
F ′ (ct+1)n
′
t+1 (ιt+1)
βt+1
∂σ̂2p,t+2
∂ιt+1
+
(
γt+1,σ̂2p,t+1 +
1
2
βt+1δt+1
)
E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂µ̂2t+2
∣∣∣∣Ft+1]
Using the fact that
γt+1,σ̂2p,t+1 +
1
2
βt+1δt+1 =
1
2
φ2µβt+1
and taking mathematical expectations with respect to Ft yields
E
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
(51)
= E
[
θt+1,σ̂2p,t+1
∣∣∣Ft]+ E
βt+1δt+1F ′ (ct+1)n′t+1 (ιt+1)
βt+1
∂σ̂2p,t+2
∂ιt+1
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft
+
1
2
φ2µβt+1E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂µ̂2t+2
∣∣∣∣Ft]
Substituting (51) into (50) and rearranging yields
E
[
θt+1,σ̂2p,t+1
∣∣∣Ft]+ (52)
E
βt+1δt+1F ′ (ct+1)n′t+1 (ιt+1)
βt+1
∂σ̂2p,t+2
∂ιt+1
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft
+
1
2
φ2µβt+1E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂µ̂2t+2
∣∣∣∣Ft]− 12E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
=
F ′ (ct)n
′
t (ιt)
βt+1
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∂ιt
From equation (33) it follows that
1
2
E
[
φ2µβt+1E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂µ̂2t+2
∣∣∣∣Ft+1]− ∂2V (xt+1)∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft] (53)
= −1
2
βt+1E
[
E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂y2t+2
∣∣∣Ft+1] ∣∣∣Ft]−
βt+1φµE
[
E
[
∂2V (xt+2)
∂µ̂t+2∂yt+2
∣∣∣∣Ft+1]∣∣∣∣Ft]−
1
2
E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
− ∂
2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
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Substituting (53) and the definition of θt+1,σ̂2p,t+1 into (52) and rearranging yields
the result
E
δt+1 ∂σ̂
2
p,t+1
∂ιt
∂σ̂2p,t+2
∂ιt+1
n′t+1 (ιt+1)
n′t (ιt)
βtF
′ (ct+1)
F ′ (ct)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft
+
1
2
βtE
 ∂2V (xt+1)∂µ̂2t+1 − ∂2V RS(xt+1,u(xt+1))∂µ̂2t+1
F ′ (ct)n′t (ιt)
/(
−∂σ̂
2
p,t+1
∂ιt
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ft

= 1
where
=
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
− ∂
2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂µ̂2t+1
= 2
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂µ̂t+1∂u (xt+1)
∂u (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
+
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂2u (xt+1)
(
∂u (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
)2
.
First order optimality ensures that
∂V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂u
=
(
0
0
)
.
Differentiating w.r.t. µ̂t+1 yields
∂V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂u (xt+1) ∂µ̂t+1
+
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂u2
∂u (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
= 0
or
∂u (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
= −
(
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂u2
)−1
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂u (xt+1) ∂µ̂t+1
.
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This yields
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
− ∂
2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂µ̂2t+1
= 2
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂µ̂t+1∂u (xt+1)
∂u (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
+
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂2u (xt+1)
(
∂u (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
)2
=
(
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂µ̂t+1∂u (xt+1)
+
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂2u (xt+1)
(
∂u (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
))
·
∂u (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
+
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂µ̂t+1∂u (xt+1)
∂u (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
=
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂µ̂t+1∂u (xt+1)
∂u (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
=
∂2V RS
(
xt+1,ut+1 (xt+1)
)
∂µ̂t+1∂kt+1
∂kt+1 (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
+
∂2V RS (xt+1,u (xt+1))
∂µ̂t+1∂ιt+1
∂ιt+1 (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
This yields the final result
Et
[
mt,t+1
Πt+1 + δt+1MCt+1
(
σ̂2p,t+2
)
MCt
(
σ̂2p,t+1
) ] = 1
where mt,t+1 =
βtF
′(ct+1)
F ′(ct)
denotes the stochastic discount factor and the follow-
ing definitions apply
Πt+1 ≡
1
2
∂2V RS(xt+1,ut+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂kt+1
∂kt+1(xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
+
∂2V RS(xt+1,ut+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂ιt+1
∂ιt+1(xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
F ′ (ct+1)
MCt
(
σ̂2p,t+1
)
≡ n′t (ιt)
/
−
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∂ιt
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∂ιt
≡ −
φ2µσ
2
v,t(
1 + ιt +
σ2v,t
σ̂2t
)2
δt+1 ≡
∂σ̂2t+2
∂σ̂2t+1
=
φ2µ(
1 + (1 + ιt+1)
σ̂2t+1
σ2v
)2
Note that given a well defined problem with a negative definite Hessian
(
∂2V RS/∂u2t+1
)
,
the term Πt+1 is positive state-by-state.
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Definition 2.
b (xt, φµ)
≡ −
σ2v,tβt(
1 + ιt (xt, φµ) +
σ2v,t
σ̂2t
)2
Et
∂ ∂V (xt+1(φµ),φµ)∂σ̂2p,t+1 − 12 ∂
2V (xt+1(φµ),φµ)
∂µ̂2t+1
∂yt+1
+
Et
φµ · ∂ ∂V (xt+1(φµ),φµ)∂σ̂2p,t+1 − 12 ∂
2V (xt+1(φµ),φµ)
∂µ̂2t+1
∂µ̂t+1
 ·
∂ιt(xt,φµ)
∂µ̂t
F ′ (ct (xt, φµ))
Condition 3.
{|φµb (xt, φµ)|}|φµ=0 = 0{∣∣∣∣φ2µ ∂b (xt, φµ)∂φµ
∣∣∣∣}∣∣∣∣
φµ=0
= 0
Proposition 6. The addends that enter the period gain Πt+1 may be written
as follows:
∂2V RS(xt+1,ut+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂kt+1
∂kt+1(xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
F ′ (ct+1)
=
Covt+1 [st+2, At+2G
′ (kt+1)mt+2]
V art+1 [µt+2]
∂kt+1 (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∂2V RS(xt+1,ut+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂ιt+1
∂ιt+1(xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
F ′ (ct+1)
= −
φ2µβt+1σ
2
v,t+1
F ′ (ct+1)
(
1 + ιt+1 +
σ2v,t+1
σ̂2t+1
)2 ∂ιt (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1Et+1
∂ ∂V (xt+2)∂σ̂2p,t+2 − 12 ∂
2V (xt+2)
∂µ̂2t+2
∂yt+2
+
Et+1
φµ · ∂ ∂V (xt+2)∂σ̂2p,t+2 − 12 ∂
2V (xt+2)
∂µ̂2t+2
∂µ̂t+2

For small φµ and given condition (3) is satisfied
∂2VRS(xt+1,ut+1)
∂µ̂t+1∂ιt+1
∂ιt+1(xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
F ′(ct+1)
is to
a first order approximation equal to zero, i.e.
∂2V RS(xt+1,ut+1,φµ)
∂µ̂t+1∂ιt+1
∂ιt+1(xt+1,φµ)
∂µ̂t+1
F ′ (ct+1 (xt+1, φµ))
≈ φ2µb (xt+1, φµ)
∣∣
φµ=0
+
d
{
φ2µb (xt+1, φµ)
}
dφµ
∣∣∣∣∣
φµ=0
φµ
= 0.
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Proposition 7. In the case of a linear period return function the following first
order approximation of Πt+1 around φµ = 0 holds:
Πt+1 (xt+1, φµ) ≈ Πt+1 (xt+1, φµ)|φµ=0 +
∂Πt+1 (xt+1, φµ)
∂φµ
∣∣∣∣
φµ=0
φµ
=
kt+1 (xt+1)
2ηt+1 (xt+1)
,
where
ηt+1 (xt+1) ≡ −
G′′ (kt+1 (xt+1))
G′ (kt+1 (xt+1))
kt+1 (xt+1) .
If, in addition, G (kt) = k
1−η
t , with 0 < η < 1, we obtain
Πt+1 ≈
((1− η)Et+1 [At+2]βt+1)
1
η
2η
.
Proof of Propositions 2 & 3. To determine the vector ∂V
RS(xt,ut)
∂ut∂µ̂t
differentiate
the following vector w.r.t. µ̂t :
∂V RS (xt,ut)
∂ut
= βt
 G′t(kt)Gt(kt)E [ ∂V ′(xt+1)∂yt+1
∣∣∣Ft]
∂σ2p,t+1
∂ιt
E
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
− 12
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣xt,ut]
− F ′ (ct)( 1n′t (ιt)
)
First, consider the element ∂
2V RS(xt,ut)
∂kt∂µ̂t
:
∂2V RS (xt,ut)
∂kt∂µ̂t
=
∂
{
βt
G′t(kt)
Gt(kt)
E
[
∂V ′(xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣Ft]}
∂µ̂t
= βt
G′t (kt)
Gt (kt)
∂
{
E
[
∂V ′(xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣Ft]}
∂µ̂t
= βt
G′t (kt)
Gt (kt)
(
E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂y2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ φµE [ ∂2V (xt+1)∂yt+1∂µ̂t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft])
which directly follows from equation (38). Further, given that ∂V (xt+1)∂yt+1 satisfies
condition (1) , one may obtain by Lemma (7)
E
[
(st+1 − E [st+1|Ft])
σ̂2t
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂y2t+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]+ φµE [ ∂2V (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
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and thus
∂2V RS (xt,ut)
∂kt∂µ̂t
= βt
G′t (kt)
Gt (kt)
E
[
(st+1 − E [st+1|Ft])
σ̂2t
∂V (xt+1)
∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= βt
G′t (kt)
Gt (kt)
E
[
(st+1 − E [st+1|Ft])
σ̂2t
At+1Gt (kt)F
′ (ct+1)
∣∣∣∣Ft]
=
Cov [st+1, At+1G
′
t (kt)βtF
′ (ct+1)| Ft]
σ̂2t
Next, consider the element ∂
2V RS(xt,ut)
∂ιt∂µ̂t
:
∂2V RS (xt,ut)
∂ιt∂µ̂t
=
∂
{
βt
∂σ2p,t+1
∂ιt
E
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
− 12
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
∣∣∣Ft]}
∂µ̂t
= βt
∂σ2p,t+1
∂ιt
∂µ̂t+1
∂µ̂t
E
[(
∂2V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1∂µ̂t+1
− 1
2
∂3V (xt+1)
∂µ̂3t+1
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+
βt
∂σ2p,t+1
∂ιt
E
[(
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
− 1
2
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
) ∂f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)
∂µ̂t
f (at+1, st+1|xt,ut)
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= βt
∂σ2p,t+1
∂ιt
E
[(
∂µ̂t+1
∂µ̂t
ζ∂µ̂t,t+1 +
∂f(at+1,st+1|xt,ut)
∂µ̂t
f (at+1, st+1|xt,ut)
)
·(
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
− 1
2
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
where the last step follows from Lemma (5) given that ∂
2V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
and ∂
2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
satisfy
condition (1) . This yields
∂2V RS (xt,ut)
∂ιt∂µ̂t
= βt
∂σ2p,t+1
∂ιt
E
[
(st+1 − µ̂t)
σ̂2t
(
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
− 1
2
∂2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
)∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
= βt
∂σ2p,t+1
∂ιt
·{
E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1∂yt+1
− 1
2
∂3V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+
φµE
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1∂µ̂t+1
− 1
2
∂3V (xt+1)
∂µ̂3t+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]}
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where the last step follows from Lemma (7) given that ∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
and ∂
2V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1
satisfy
condition (1) . We therefore may summarize the results
∂2V RS(xt,ut)
∂µ̂t∂kt
∂kt(xt)
∂µ̂t
F ′ (ct)
=
Cov [st+1, At+1G
′ (kt)mt+1| Ft]
V art [µt+1]
∂kt (xt)
∂µ̂t
∂2V RS(xt,ut)
∂µ̂t∂ιt
∂ιt(xt)
∂µ̂t
F ′ (ct)
= −
φ2µβtσ
2
v,t
F ′ (ct)
(
1 + ιt +
σ2v,t
σ̂2t
)2 ∂ιt (xt)∂µ̂t{
E
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1∂yt+1
− 1
2
∂3V (xt+1)
∂µ̂2t+1∂yt+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+
φµE
[
∂2V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1∂µ̂t+1
− 1
2
∂3V (xt+1)
∂µ̂3t+1
∣∣∣∣∣Ft
]}
.
Further, given condition (3) is satisfied, we may write a first order approximation
of
∂2VRS(xt,ut)
∂µ̂t∂ιt
∂ιt(xt)
∂µ̂t
F ′(ct)
around φµ = 0 as follows:
∂2V RS(xt,ut,φµ)
∂µ̂t∂ιt
∂ιt(xt,φµ)
∂µ̂t
F ′ (ct (xt, φµ))
≈
{
φ2µb (xt, φµ)
}∣∣
φµ=0
+
d
{
φ2µb (xt, φµ)
}
dφµ
∣∣∣∣∣
φµ=0
φµ
=
{
φ2µb (xt, φµ)
}∣∣
φµ=0
+
{
φ2µ
∂b (xt, φµ)
∂φµ
+ 2φµb (xt, φµ)
}∣∣∣∣
φµ=0
φµ
= 0.
Hence, to a first order approximation of φµ around φµ = 0, the term
∂2VRS(xt,ut)
∂µ̂t∂ιt
∂ιt(xt)
∂µ̂t
F ′(ct)
is negligible. Further, for a linear period return function, one may write:
Cov [st+1, At+1G
′ (kt)mt+1| Ft]
V art [µt+1]
∂kt (xt)
∂µ̂t
=
1
2
Cov [st+1, At+1| Ft]
V art [µt+1]
G′ (kt)βt
∂kt (xt)
∂µ̂t
=
1
2
V art [µt+1]
V art [µt+1]
Et [At+1]G
′ (kt)βt
∂kt (xt)
∂µ̂t
=
1
2
Et [At+1]G
′ (kt)βt
∂kt (xt)
∂µ̂t
=
1
2
∂kt (xt)
∂µ̂t
=
kt (xt)
2ηt
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where
ηt ≡ −
G′′ (kt)
G′ (kt)
kt,
and where we used the fact that by first order optimality the following relation
holds,
βtEt [At+1]G
′ (kt) = 1,
with
Et [At+1] = exp
{
ωa + µ̂t +
1
2
V art [at+1]
}
,
and which, by the implicit function theorem, yields the equation
∂kt (xt)
∂µ̂t
=
kt
ηt
.
Further, for Gt (kt) = k
1−η one obtains
kt = ((1− η)Et [At+1]βt)
1
η
ηt = η
and thus
Πt =
((1− η)Et [At+1]βt)
1
η
2η
.
This completes the proof.
Proposition 8 (Human Capital). The decision problem associated with the
Bellman equation (27) , adjusted by the specifications
µt = σ
2
µ,t−1εµ,t
at+1 = ωa,t + µt + σv,tεa,t+1
ωa,t+1 = ω̄ + φωωa,t + σωεω,r+1
ht = δhιt−1 with 0 < δh < 1
n (ιt, ht) = χ
(ιt − ht)2
2
with χ > 0,
implies the following necessary intertemporal condition for optimal information
acquisition ι :
Et
[
mt+1
Πt+1 + δt+1MCt+1
MCt
]
= 1
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where mt+1 =
βtF
′(ct+1)
F ′(ct)
denotes the stochastic discount factor, and
Πt+1 =
1
2
(
st+1
σ2µ,t
G (kt+1)
G′ (kt+1)
− Covt+1 [at+2,mt+2Yt+2]
V art+1 [at+2]
)
MCt = −nι (ιt, ht)
/
∂σ̂2t+1
∂ιt
δt+1 = δh
∂σ̂2t+2
∂ιt+1
/
∂σ̂2t+1
∂ιt
∂σ̂2t+1
∂ιt
= −σ2µ,t
σ2µ,t
σ2v,t
(
1 + ιt
σ2µ,t
σ2v
)−2
and where σ̂2t+1 = σ̂
2
t+1
(
σ2µ,t, ιt
)
. Under log-utility Et
[
mt+1Π
log
t+1
]
= 0, implying
steady state information acquisition equal to zero (ῑ = 0). Under linear utility
with exogenous, Ft−measurable discount factors mt+1 = βt, and G (kt) = k1−η
with 0 < η < 1, the following relation holds
Et
[
Πγ=0t+1
]
= Et
[
((1− η)mt+2Et [At+2])
1
η
2η
]
Further, if mt+2 is Ft measurable, we obtain
Et
[
Πγ=0t+1
]
=
((1− η)mt+2)
1
η e
1
η{ω̄+φωωa,t+ 12 (σ̂2t+1+σ2v)+ 12η (σ2ω+σ4µ,t/V art[st+1])}
2η
.
Proof. In this setup, the state is characterized by the vector xt =
(
yt, ht, µ̂t, σ̂
2
t , zt
)′
,
where µ̂t ≡ Et [µt] and σ̂2t ≡ V art [µt] . The law of motion is given by:
yt+1 = at+1 + logG (kt)
ht+1 = δhιt
µ̂t+1 =
σ2µ,t
σ2µ,t+
σ2v,t
ιt
st+1
σ̂2t+1 =
σ2µ,t
1+
σ2µ,t
σ2v,t
ιt
zt+1 = ωz + φzzt + σzεz,t+1
The first order necessary condition for ιt is given by
F ′ (ct)nι (ιt, ht)
=
∫
βt
(
∂µ̂t+1
∂ιt
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
+
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∂ιt
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2t+1
+
∂ht+1
∂ιt
∂V (xt+1)
∂ht+1
)
·
f (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1|xt,ut) dλ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1) +∫
βtV (xt+1)
∂f (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1|xt,ut)
∂ιt
dλ (at+1, st+1, εz,t+1)
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Since st+1 is independent of (at+1, εz,t+1) one may write
F ′ (ct)nι (ιt, ht)
= Et
[
βt
(
∂µ̂t+1
∂ιt
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
+
∂σ̂2p,t+1
∂ιt
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2p,t+1
+
∂ht+1
∂ιt
∂V (xt+1)
∂ht+1
)]
+
Et
[
βtV (xt+1)
∂f(st+1|xt,ut)
∂ιt
f (st+1|xt,ut)
]
First, consider the term ∂V (xt+1)∂µ̂t+1 . By the envelope theorem one may write
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
=
∂ {F (c (xt+1)) + Et+1 [βt+1V (xt+2)]}
∂µ̂t+1
=
∂Et+1 [βt+1V (xt+2)]
∂µ̂t+1
= βt+1
Et+1
 ∂ft+1(at+2)∂µ̂t+1
ft+1 (at+2)
V (xt+2) +
∂V (xt+2)
∂xt+2
∂xt+2
∂µ̂t+1

= βt+1Et+1
 ∂ft+1(at+2)∂µ̂t+1
ft+1 (at+2)
V (xt+2)

It may be verified that
∂ft+1(at+2)
∂µ̂t+1
ft+1 (at+2)
=
at+2 − Et+1 [at+2]
V art+1 [at+2]
with
Et+1 [at+2] = ωa,t+1 + µ̂t+1
V art+1 [at+2] = σ̂
2
t+1 + σ
2
v
Given V (xt+2) satisfies condition (1) one may write
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
= βt+1Covt+1
[
at+2 − Et+1 [at+2]
V art+1 [at+2]
, V (xt+2)
]
= βt+1
Covt+1 [at+2, V (xt+2)]
V art+1 [at+2]
= βt+1
V art+1 [at+2]
V art+1 [at+2]
Et+1
[
∂V (xt+2)
∂xt+2
∂xt+2
∂at+2
]
= βt+1Et+1
[
∂V (xt+2)
∂yt+2
]
Further, using the envelope theorem
∂V (xt+2)
∂yt+2
= F ′ (ct+2) · Yt+2
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we obtain
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
= βt+1Et+1 [F
′ (ct+2) · Yt+2]
= F ′ (ct+1)
G (kt+1)
G′ (kt+1)
Et+1
[
At+2G
′ (kt+1)
βt+1F
′ (ct+2)
F ′ (ct+1)
]
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
= F ′ (ct+1)
G (kt+1)
G′ (kt+1)
Next, consider the term ∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2t+1
. By the envelope theorem we may write
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2t+1
=
∂F (c (xt+1)) + Et+1 [βt+1V (xt+2)]
∂σ̂2t+1
=
∂Et+1 [βt+1V (xt+2)]
∂σ̂2t+1
= βt+1Et+1
 ∂ft+1(at+2)∂σ̂2t+1
ft+1 (at+2)
V (xt+2) +
∂V (xt+2)
∂xt+2
∂xt+2
∂σ̂2t+1

= βt+1Et+1
 ∂ft+1(at+2)∂σ̂2t+1
ft+1 (at+2)
V (xt+2)

It may be verified that
∂ft+1(at+2)
∂σ̂2t+1
ft+1 (at+2)
=
1
2
(at+2 − Et+1 [at+2])2 − V art+1 [at+2]
(V art+1 [at+2])
2
Given V (xt+2) satisfies condition (1) we obtain
∂V (xt+1)
∂σ̂2t+1
= βt+1Et+1
[
1
2
(at+2 − Et+1 [at+2])2 − V art+1 [at+2]
(V art+1 [at+2])
2 V (xt+2)
]
=
βt+1
2
V art+1 [at+2]Et+1
[
(at+2 − Et+1 [at+2]) ∂V (xt+2)∂xt+2
∂xt+2
∂at+2
]
(V art+1 [at+2])
2
=
βt+1
2
Covt+1
[
at+2,
∂V (xt+2)
∂yt+2
]
V art+1 [at+2]
=
βt+1
2
Covt+1 [at+2, F
′ (ct+2) · Yt+2]
V art+1 [at+2]
=
1
2
F ′ (ct+1)
G (kt+1)
G′ (kt+1)
Covt+1
[
at+2,
βt+1F
′(ct+2)
F ′(ct+1)
At+2G
′ (kt+1)
]
V art+1 [at+2]
=
1
2
F ′ (ct+1)
Covt+1 [at+2,mt+2Yt+2]
V art+1 [at+2]
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Next, we consider the term ∂V (xt+1)∂ht+1 .
∂V (xt+1)
∂ht+1
=
∂F (c (xt+1)) + Et+1 [βt+1V (xt+2)]
∂ht+1
= −F ′ (ct+1)nh (ιt+1, ht+1) +
∂Et+1 [βt+1V (xt+2)]
∂ht+1
= −F ′ (ct+1)nh (ιt+1, ht+1) + Et+1
[
βt+1
∂V (xt+2)
∂xt+2
∂xt+2
∂ht+1
]
= F ′ (ct+1)nι (ιt+1, ht+1)
since, given the functional form assumed, nι (ιt, ht) = −nh (ιt, ht) . Finally con-
sider the term Et
[
V (xt+1)
∂ft(st+1)
∂ιt
/ft (st+1)
]
. It may be verified that
∂ft(st+1)
∂ιt
ft (st+1)
= −
σ2v,t
2
s2t+1 − V art [st+1](
ιtσ2µ,t + σ
2
v,t
)2
Hence, we obtain
Et
[
V (xt+1)
∂ft(st+1)
∂ιt
ft (st+1)
]
= −
σ2v,t
(
Et
[
s2t+1V (xt+1)
]
− V art [st+1]Et [V (xt+1)]
)
2
(
ιtσ2µ,t + σ
2
v,t
)2
= −
σ2v,t (Covt [st+1, V (xt+1) st+1]− V art [st+1]Et [V (xt+1)])
2
(
ιtσ2µ,t + σ
2
v,t
)2
= −
σ2v,tV art [st+1]Et
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∂µ̂t+1
∂st+1
st+1
]
2
(
ιtσ2µ,t + σ
2
v,t
)2
where
∂µ̂t+1
∂st+1
=
σ2µ,t
σ2µ,t +
σ2v,t
ιt
such that
Et
[
V (xt+1)
∂ft(st+1)
∂ιt
ft (st+1)
]
= −
σ2v,tV art [st+1]
σ2µ,t
σ2µ,t+
σ2v,t
ιt
Et
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
st+1
]
2
(
ιtσ2µ,t + σ
2
v,t
)2
= −1
2
Et
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
st+1
σ2µ,t
σ2v,t(
1 + ιt
σ2µ,t
σ2v,t
)2
 .
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Note that
∂µ̂t+1
∂ιt
=
st+1
σ2µ,t
σ2v,t(
1 + ιt
σ2µ,t
σ2v,t
)2
Hence, we may write
Et
[
V (xt+1)
∂ft(st+1)
∂ιt
ft (st+1)
]
= −1
2
Et
[
∂V (xt+1)
∂µ̂t+1
∂µ̂t+1
∂ιt
]
.
Substituting these results into the FONC yields
1 = Et
mt+1 12
(
∂µ̂t+1
∂ιt
G(kt+1)
G′(kt+1)
+
∂σ̂2t+1
∂ιt
Covt+1[at+2,mt+2Yt+2]
V art+1[at+2]
)
+ δhnι (ιt+1, ht+1)
nι (ιt, ht)

where mt+1 ≡ βtF
′(ct+1)
F ′(ct)
and
∂µ̂t+1
∂ιt
= st+1
σ2µ,t
σ2v,t(
1 + ιt
σ2µ,t
σ2v,t
)2
∂σ̂2t+1
∂ιt
= −σ2µ,t
σ2µ,t
σ2v,t(
1 + ιt
σ2µ,t
σ2v,t
)2
In terms of the notation previously used we obtain
Et
[
mt+1
Πt+1 + δt+1MCt+1
MCt
]
= 1,
with
Πt+1 =
1
2
(
st+1
σ2µ,t
G (kt+1)
G′ (kt+1)
− Covt+1 [at+2,mt+2Yt+2]
V art+1 [at+2]
)
MCt = −nι (ιt, ht)
/
∂σ̂2t+1
∂ιt
δt+1 = δh
∂σ̂2t+2
∂ιt+1
/
∂σ̂2t+1
∂ιt
∂σ̂2t+1
∂ιt
= −σ2µ,t
σ2µ,t
σ2v,t
(
1 + ιt
σ2µ,t
σ2v,t
)−2
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and where σ̂2t+1 = σ̂
2
t+1
(
σ2µ,t, ιt
)
. Under linear utility with exogenous, Ft mea-
surable discount factors mt+1 = βt,
Covt+1 [at+2,mt+2Yt+2]
= V art+1 [at+2]Et+1 [mt+2At+2]G (kt+1)
The FONC for capital,
Et+1 [mt+2At+2]G
′ (kt+1) = 1,
allows us to write
Covt+1 [at+2,mt+2Yt+2]
=
G (kt+1)
G′ (kt+1)
V art+1 [at+2] .
Substituting this result into the previous equation yields
Πγ=0t+1 =
1
2
G (kt+1)
G′ (kt+1)
(
st+1
σ2µ,t
− 1
)
=
1
2
Et+1 [mt+2At+2]G (kt+1)
(
st+1
σ2µ,t
− 1
)
where kt+1 is given by
kt+1 = G
′−1
(
1
Et+1 [mt+2At+2]
)
with G′−1 denoting the inverse of G′. For G (kt) = k
1−η, with 0 < η < 1 one
obtains
kt+1 = (Et+1 [mt+2At+2] (1− η))
1
η
G (kt+1) = (Et+1 [mt+2At+2] (1− η))
1−η
η
Substituting yields
Πγ=0t+1 =
1
2
(1− η)
1−η
η (Et+1 [mt+2At+2])
1
η
(
st+1
σ2µ,t
− 1
)
Taking conditional expectations
Et
[
Πγ=0t+1
]
=
1
2
(1− η)
1−η
η Et
[
(Et+1 [mt+2At+2])
1
η
(
st+1
σ2µ,t
− 1
)]
where
Et
[
(mt+2Et+1 [At+2])
1
η
(
st+1
σ2µ,t
− 1
)]
Covt
[
m
1
η
t+2e
1
η{ωa,t+1+µ̂t+1+ 12 (σ̂2t+1+σ2v,t+1)}, st+1
]
= V ar [s]Et
[
m
1
η
t+2e
1
η{ωa,t+1+µ̂t+1+ 12 (σ̂2t+1+σ2v,t+1)}
]
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Conditinal on Cov [st+1,mt+2] = 0, such that mt+2 = βt+1 does not reveal any
information about the hidden productivity state, we may write
Et
[
(mt+2Et+1 [At+2])
1
η
(
st+1
σ2µ,t
− 1
)]
= Et
[
m
1
η
t+2e
1
η{ωa,t+1+µ̂t+1+ 12 (σ̂2t+1+σ2v,t+1)}
(
st+1
σ2µ,t
− 1
)]
=
1
σ2µ,t
Covt
[
m
1
η
t+2e
1
η
{
ωa,t+1+
∂µ̂t+1
∂st+1
st+1+
1
2 (σ̂
2
t+1+σ
2
v,t+1)
}
, st+1
]
−
Et
[
m
1
η
t+2e
1
η
{
ωa,t+1+
∂µ̂t+1
∂st+1
st+1+
1
2 (σ̂
2
t+1+σ
2
v,t+1)
}]
= Et
[
m
1
η
t+2e
1
η
{
ωa,t+1+
∂µ̂t+1
∂st+1
st+1+
1
2 (σ̂
2
t+1+σ
2
v,t+1)
}](
V art [st+1]
σ2µ,t
1
η
∂µ̂t+1
∂st+1
− 1
)
= Et
[
m
1
η
t+2e
1
η{ωa,t+1+µ̂t+1+ 12 (σ̂2t+1+σ2v,t+1)}
](
1
η
− 1
)
= Et
[
(Et [mt+2At+2])
1
η
] 1
η
(1− η)
such that
Et
[
Πγ=0t+1
]
= Et
[
((1− η)mt+2Et [At+2])
1
η
2η
]
which is always greater than zero since since 0 < η < 1. Further, given that
mt+2 is Ft measurable and given that σ2v,t+1 = σ2v we obtain
Et
[
Πγ=0t+1
]
=
((1− η)mt+2)
1
η e
1
η{ω̄+φωωa,t+ 12 (σ̂2t+1+σ2v)+ 12η (σ2ω+σ4µ,t/V art[st+1])}
2η
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